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A bstract

Islam is an ever-present reality in the political, economic and social life
throughout the Arab-Islamic world. In this region, there exists a pervasive notion that
Islam should be an integral part o f all economic and political aspects o f the state. At

present, many nations across the Arab-Islamic world face political and economic
instability and uncertainty. Since the legitimacy of many regimes in the region is
consistently called into question, and since Islamic movements and political parties often
form the strongest opposition, the emergence of an Islamic government is a strong
possibility. Overall, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the concept of an Islamic
Economic Option. This thesis looks at what extent Islamic economic concepts differ from
Western economic models. It asks whether or not an IEO could serve as a practical
alternative to Western models and form a program that is compatible with the global
order. Given an Islamic opposition movement’s hypothetical rise to power, this thesis
also asks what sort of economic strategy the group would follow and if it would retreat or
remain involved in the global economy. This thesis concludes that while there is no
specific economic model found in Islam, there are a series of principles and guidelines
that could be used to construct an economic model or system based on Islam. The
flexibility of an IEO allows it to be adjusted for different social and time contexts. On the
whole, Islamic economic concepts do not significantly differ from existing models.
Nevertheless, while an indigenously created economic system may theoretically be
beneficial for the region, for the most part, Islamic opposition movements have not
delineated clear economic programs. In the end, this thesis contends that given the right
leadership, the strength and flexibility of Islamic economic principles allows the
possibility that an IEO could be both a feasible and practical option for the Arab-Islamic
world. The accomplishments of Islamic banking initiatives support this possibility.
Further research could build upon the examination of Islamic economic theories and
financial institutions to conduct detailed case studies on a sample of Islamic banks in a
cross-section of nations. Moreover, a further study could be pursued to monitor the policy,
position papers, publications and press releases of a sample of Islamic opposition
movements over a number of years to gauge the strength and pragmatism of their
economic platforms.
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I n t r o d u c t io n

The Western convention of separating religion and state frowns upon the notion
of religion as an intricate part of politics. Thus, the idea that religion should play a role in
the political and economic structure of a society is considered objectionable to many
Western scholars.1Among those religions that purport religious influence in socio
political and economic spheres, Islam seems to incite the most wariness. In fact, the idea
of an Islamic political or economic system of any variety seems to invoke fear. People are
often fearful of something they do not know. Hence, the contemporary re-emergence of
Islam in Muslim politics has drawn worldwide attention. The geopolitical significance of
an Islamic resurgence is of substantive interest to the western world.2 Moreover,
increasing globalization, coupled with the stake that many countries with a majority
Muslim population have in the global economy, lends greater concern toward the
possibility of the “Islamization” of any given country’s economic structure or
development path.
Given the interest this fear generates, it is of considerable appeal to address what
an Islamic-directed development system would entail. Moreover, confronting the
question of whether this system would interact or indeed retreat from the globalized
world is also significant to the development of this research. In order to conceptualize an
Islamic development model and assess its importance, it is crucial to understand why
1 See for example, Donald E. Smith’s Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1970). In this book, Smith argues that the “secularization of politics continues as a fundamental
aspect o f political development.” 201
2 John Esposito, Voices o f Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 11
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Islam is always at the forefront of any discussion of social, political or economic change
in much of the Arab-Islamic world.3
When Islam emerged in the sixth century of the Common Era (CE), it functioned
as an agent of dramatic change.4 Self-defined as the fulfillment of the prophetic legacy of
the Abrahamic faiths; Islam attributes itself with bringing the final message from God to
humanity and providing direction to the monotheistic worship of the ‘one true God,’
Allah.5 According to Muslim tradition, the prophet Muhammad received his message
from God through the angel Gabriel.6 These words are believed to be of divine origin and
indeed are considered the very words of God.7
Along with a clearly defined belief system, the arrival of Islam initiated social
reconstruction, provided new political direction and unfolded economic precepts deemed
desirable for both progress and obedience to the Almighty. In sum, Islam represented a
“thoroughly integrated religiopolitical unity.”8 The Prophet was not just a religious figure

3 For purposes o f this thesis, the region containing Arabic-speaking nations o f the Islamic world,
particularly those that fall into the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, shall be the focus.
4 See Albert Hourani’s A History o f the Arab Peoples (New York: MJF Books, 1991), 19 - 25 for an
introductory discussion o f the change begun during the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime and continued
through the rule o f the first caliph. Bernard Lewis also briefly outlines this change in Islam and the West
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4.
5 Shaikh Ali Al-Tantawi, General Introduction to Islam (Jeddah: A1 Manara Publishing and Distributing
House, 1997), 46.
Allah means ‘The God’ in Arabic . Mahmoud M. Ayoub, “The Islamic Tradition” in Willard Oxtoby, ed.,
World Religion - Western Traditions 2nd Edition (Don Mills: Oxford University Press Canada, 2002), 342.
6 Ayoub, 344. The Angel Gabriel is called Jibreal in Arabic.
7 Peter J. Awn, “Faith and Practice” in Marjorie Kelly, ed., Islam, the Religious and Political Life o f a
World Community (New York: Praeger Publishers CBS Educational and Professional Publishing, 1984), 2 3.
8 Smith, 266.
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but also a political head, judge and leader of the army.9 It is important to emphasize that
the message of Islam was not merely religious in nature. In fact, Islam is commonly
referred to as a “way of life.”10 For its believers, Islam provides a complete guide to
living that includes all social, political and economic aspects. Since the Qur’an is
understood to be of divine origin, it is not surprising that the directives of the religion are
accepted as a guide for humanity. Indeed, it is the notion that Islam is a complete way of
life that makes it difficult to separate Islam from the political and economic aspirations of
a nation comprised predominantly of Muslims.11
Consequently, Islam is an ever-present reality in political and economic life
throughout the Arab-Islamic world. Indifferent to how secular or religious a regime may
be, any form of government in power in the Islamic world must at the very least pay lip
service to Islam in order to justify its rule. Furthermore, the history of colonialism and
Western subjugation throughout the Arab-Islamic world, combined with the problem of
legitimacy surrounding the rule of many current governments in place in the Middle East,
has made the region ripe for the re-emergence of Islam. In fact, in many nations of the
Arab-Islamic world, the strongest and perhaps most plausible opposition to existing
leadership are Islamic movements and/or Islamic based political parties.12

9 Smith, 266.
10 Ayoub, 360.
11 Maijorie Kelly discusses the lack of distinction between religious and socioeconomic and political realms
in her chapter entitled “ Muslim Nation States” in Maijorie Kelly, ed., Islam, the Religious and Political
Life o f a World Community (New York: Praeger Publishers CBS Educational and Professional Publishing,
1984), 173 - 195.
12 For more detailed discussion o f the Islamic presence in the political world o f many Middle Eastern
nations see Kelly’s “Muslim Nation States” in Kelly, 1 7 3 - 194 and Roger Owen, “The Politics of
Religious Revival” in State, Power and Politics in the Making o f the Modern Middle East, 2nd Edition
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 173 - 191.

3
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Islamic resurgence has surfaced in a variety of forms ranging from legitimate
political opposition parties, to militant groups, to pulpit-based religious rhetoric.13 The
arbitrary nature of regimes in the Arab-Islamic world as well as the seeming fragility of
many governments makes the emergence of an Islamic based leadership a strong
possibility. Even without the arrival of a new Islamic government, the idea that Islam
should play a stronger role in the political and economic aspects of the state is being
called for throughout much of the region.14 Furthermore, the imposition of Western
methods of development seems to have largely failed.15 Thus, a claim can be made that
an indigenous strategy for development may be more feasible, practical and sustain
greater legitimacy. However, the implications that might-accompany the implementation
of indigenous Islamic models alarm the Western world.
The purpose of this research is to examine the concept of an Islamic economic
and development model. In so doing, it will explore the framework of an Islamic
economic model, its practicality, its compatibility with the contemporary world, and the
extent to which it differs from existing models. First, this research will survey the
theoretical foundations of Islamic economics. Second, it will discuss the political
situation in the Arab world, and examine the quandary of political legitimacy in the
region. Third, this research will provide a historical background that highlights relevant
Islamic resurgence and reformation movements in the twentieth century to the present

13 Ibid and John Esposito, ed., Voices o f Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
14 M. Umer Chapra, Islam and Economic Development: a Strategy fo r Development with Justice and
Stability (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Though and the Islamic Research Institute, 1993), xii.
15 Muhammad Al-Buraey, Administrative Development: An Islamic Perspective (London: KPI Limited,
1985), 175.
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time. Finally, it will look at what contemporary Islamist movements have proposed in
terms of economic development as well as Islamic banking around the world.

M etho do log y

The central research question guiding this study asks if there is an Islamic
economic model and if so, what constitutes this model. It also looks at whether this
plausible model is both practical for the region and compatible with the Western world.
There are three main contentions put forth throughout this thesis. First, there is a strong
possibility that given regime-change in an Arab state, the Islamic opposition would most
likely attain power because Islamists form the strongest political opposition to existing
leaders. Second, there is no specific Islamic economic model. However, there are
principles and guidelines that can be gleaned from Islam’s sacred texts and from Muslim
thinkers that can be shaped to form an economic option based on Islam. Third, there is
potential that an indigenously-constructed economic system based on Islam could be a
practical alternative for the Arab region. By and large, an Islamic economic option is not
that different from existing models. Though this option could theoretically be compatible
with the global order, it seems likely that many of the current Muslim opposition
movements would withdraw from this order. At one level, modem Islamic banking
initiatives across the world have been successful in operating in today’s financial milieu.
At another level, at this early stage in their political development, the Islamist opposition
has largely been unable to craft an economic platform that that is either practical or viable.
For the purpose of composing this research, qualitative methods have been
utilized. Secondary sources were consulted, including books, scholarly journals, articles

5
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as well as the literature of sacred texts. In order to more accurately delineate the elements
of this model as well as address questions concerned with its compatibility and
practicality, it was necessary to consult a large number of translated works written by
past and present residents of the Arab-Islamic world. A second element of this study
involved a limited amount of field research. A number of informal interviews were
conducted in both the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Literature was also gathered
from these locations. One interview involved a meeting with Ahmed El Shall, the senior
vice president of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank. Several other informal interviews were
conducted at varying, levels of the Capital Market Authority of Oman, the Muscat
Securities Market and the Omani Centre for Investment Promotion and Export
Development (OCIPED).
Due to the space confines of a thesis, it was necessary to restrict this analysis to
the Arab-Islamic world. Moreover, given the research interests of the writer, speaking of
the Arab-Middle East was better suited to their future academic direction. The Islamic
Republic of Iran would make an interesting case given the focus of the research.
However, it was not considered in detail for two reasons. Simply stated, while Iran is an
Islamic state, it is not an Arab state. However, Iran’s Islamic institutions, government,
and the Islamic revolution in general do provide an interesting political reference point.
Be that as it may, the abundant literature on Iran is confined to political, ideological,
religious and international relations issues. Literature in economic policies is insufficient.
Hence, for the purposes of this paper, the bulk of discussion will focus on the Arabic
speaking countries of the Middle East. The nations under examination will be described
in greater detail in Chapter 2.

6
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C hapter 1:
Literature Review: The Islamic Economic Option (IEO)

The study of Islam and socio-economic development is not very prominent in
scholarly literature today. A majority of current works on Islam discuss ‘hotter’ topics
such as terrorism in the wake of September 11th, 2001. The stronger and more specific
studies on Islam and socio-economic development are from the 1950s until the early
1980s. Today, there is a limited amount of recent work in the area. Good scholarship
involving solid and comprehensive analyses is generally dated. Moreover, much of the
older material in Islamic studies utilizes outdated terminology and ways of portraying
cultures outside the Western world. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis aimed at
updating existing literature and providing new analysis is desperately needed for this field
of study. The more recent theories and other premises guiding work in the area have been
established in literature covering a wide range of areas. Hence, recent materials have
been consulted on Islam and politics, Islam and capitalism and Islam in relation to the
Western world, postmodernism, liberalism and globalism. The discussions presented in
both dated and more recent literature can be categorized into three main themes relevant
to the study of Islam and economic development; namely the capitalist sector, social
justice and the problem of interest and investment.

The Capitalist Sector
For the purpose of this discussion, Maxime Rodinson’s definition of the capitalist
sector will be employed. Rodinson is one of the foremost scholars on Islam and

7
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Capitalism16 His rather lengthy discussion describing the capitalist sector can be
narrowed down to three main elements:
(1) Mode of production:
a. Production carried on in an enterprise where wages are paid to “free”
workers for the purposes of producing commodities to be sold for the
profit of the enterprise.
(2) Trade and Commerce:
a. Trade employing money in order to develop production for the market.
(3) Rational Activity:
a. Involving the “expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities
for exchange.”17
This discussion of the capitalist sector is noticeably void of any discussion of investment
and interest. It is necessary to separate the topic of investment and interest into a separate
discussion because of the special indicatives in Islamic doctrine toward interest. Thus, the
problem of interest in the Islamic model shall be discussed later.
An analysis of Islam and the capitalist sector is of particular interest given
assumptions made by some scholars claiming that Islam is antithetical to capitalism. This
school of thought often argues that Islam is not compatible with economic development
primarily because the very religion “breeds fatalism, low aspirations and other backward
symbols and myths of traditionalism.”18 Other prominent critics of the Islamic model,
namely Bernard Lewis (1916-present) and Elie Kedourie (1926-1992), concur in their
analysis of Islam as incompatible with capitalism insofar as it continues to object to the
separation of religion and state, thus precluding the secularization of political and

16 Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, translated by Brian Pearce (Austin: University o f Texas Press:
1978).
17 Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, 4-11.
18 Ozay Mehmet, Islam and Economic Development: the Challenge o f Modernity (Ottawa: Asian Pacific
Research and Resource Centre, 1991). Series title: Working paper series (Carleton University. Asian
Pacific Research and Resource Centre), 15.
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economic institutions which they see as a prerequisite to development.19 Elie Kedourie
further concluded that in the Arab-Islamic world ideological politics “provide[s] no
alleviation for the ills of the Arab world, nor can [it] promise anything but heavy-handed
rule conducive neither to welfare, nor to freedom, nor to prosperity.”20
Literature from an earlier generation of scholars also contributed to the above
noted sentiment. Max Weber (1864-1920) was one such author. He is perhaps best
known for developing the ‘Protestant Ethic’ theory of capitalist development. Weber also
emphasized the necessity of the secularization of political institutions.21 However, his
assessment of Islam was far grimmer than that of Lewis and Kedourie. Weber’s wellknown work, the Sociology o f Religion, examined the relationship between religion and
capitalism.22 In it, Weber grouped Islam with other ‘Asian’ religions and argued that
there was an “absence of rational capitalism” outside the Westernized world.23 While he
discussed what he described as the “essential political character [that] marked all the
chief ordinances of Islam,” 24 he maintained that Islam lacks “rationalism” and is
fundamentally “feudal.” 25 Weber can be credited with developing, systemizing and

19 Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 1992), 2-7; Bernard Lewis, “The Return o f Islam” in Islam and the West (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 133-154; and Bernard Lewis, The Political Language o f Islam (Chicago: The
University o f Chicago Press, 1988), 2-5.
20 Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 1992), 105.
21 Bryan S. Tinner, “Islam and Secularization” in Weber and Islam (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd., 1974), 151-170.
22 Max Weber, The Sociology o f Religion [translated by Ephraim Fischoff] (London: Beacon Press, 1963).
23 Bryan S. Turner, Capitalism and Class in the Middle East (London: Heinemann Educational Books,
1984), 30.
24 Weber, 263.
25 Ibid., 262-266.
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advancing the theory of Muslim “fatalistic indifference” as opposed to the European
“spirit of initiative.”26
Bryan S. Turner argued against the view emphasizing the essentiality of
secularization. He disagreed with the idea that secularization was an inevitable process
across the globe. He maintained that even if this were the case, then different social and
cultural contexts would necessarily vary the type and extent of secularization in any
given region. Thus, he claimed that “if secularization is taking place, then the
secularization of Islam is likely to be very different from the secularization of
Christianity.”27 As such, the experience of development in the Islamic world has varied
and will continue to vary from the Western and Christian experience. Turner asserted that
the claim that development can only be successful if it follows the path of the Western
world overlooks the different paths to development taken by Eastern nations like Japan
and China.28 On that note, J.H. Boeke goes so far as to consider the Western model as
“totally inapplicable” to developing regions. He cautioned against “transplanting] the
tender, delicate hothouse plants of Western theory to tropical soil, where an early death
awaits them.”29
Other schools of thought that discount the secularization argument also question
why an Islamic based model is regarded as inimical to development. These scholars

26 Rodinson, 76-77.
27 Turner, Weber and Islam, 158.
28 Ibid., 151-170.
29 Dr. J.H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy o f Dual Societies (New York: Institute of Pacific
Revelations, 1953) cited in K.M. Azam, Economics and Politics o f Development - an Islamic Perspective
(Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988), 9.
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provide a far more favourable outlook on Islam in connection with the capitalist sector.
Maxime Rodinson (1915-2004), a leading scholar in the area, authored a comprehensive
300-page study entitled Islam and Capitalism.30 In this book, Rodinson provided a
careful analysis that discussed the problem of development in the Islamic world, the
question of compatibility, economic practice in Islam and the Muslim world today as well
as the influence of ideology.31 Through his analysis of the Qur’an, Rodinson argued that
contrary to Weber’s thesis, rationality played a large part in Islam.32 In fact, he contended
that “the [Qur’an] accords a much larger place to reason than do the sacred books of
Judaism and Christianity.”
Moreover, Rodinson demonstrated that there was nothing in Islamic theology
against wage labour, private property, commercial activity or trade. In fact, he argued that
Islam looks favourably upon commerce and trade while simultaneously condemning
fraudulent business practices. Furthermore, Rodinson showed how various references in
the Qur’an support private property as outlined in the rules of inheritance as well as the
right of the individual to be paid a fair wage for work done.34 Thus, he concluded that
“the ideas of Islam on economic life, or on the conduct of man in general, are not in the
least opposed to an orientation of activity in the direction of capitalism.”35

30 Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism.
31 Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism.
32 Ibid., 78,99.
33 Ibid., 91.
34 Ibid., 13-17.
35 Ibid., 116.
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A number of other scholars, secular and Muslim alike, concur with Rodinson’s
analysis. According to Mohammad Shawqi Al-Fanjari, a Muslim scholar on Islamic
Economy, the principles of economics outlined in Islam are not isolated statements but
rather are intertwined with other overarching aspects of life. He stated, “Islam has a
realistic view towards life. In its opinion, all aspects of life are inter-dependent and its
materialist side has to rely on its spiritual side. For this reason, Islam's economic
principles are mixed with others which may be material, social or educational.”36 In light
of the interdependent of economic, political and religious aspirations in Islam, it is useful
to be aware of the fundamental principles of an Islamic economy identified by Muslim
scholars. These principles are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1
Principles of Islamic Economy
Encouraged
Participation in economic activity
Earning profit
Abundant production
Equitable wages for labour or service
Private ownership
Equitable distribution of earnings
Moderation in economic relations
Proportion of wealth given to needy
Leaving property to relatives
Satisfaction of essential wants

Discouraged/Forbidden
Gaining money through usury
Acquiring money through gambling
Accruing wealth by exploiting the weak
Using property of other without legal claim
Wastefully spending money
Hoarding wealth

See footnote for references.

36 Mohammad Shawqi Al-Fanjari, Islam and Contemporary Economic Theories [book online] (n.p.,
WPONLINE.ORG, 2002, accessed December 2004); available from http://www.witnesspioneer.org/vil/Books/MF_ICIT/Default.htm.
37 Al-Fanjari [book online]; Khalid M. Ishaque, “The Islamic Approach to Economic Development” in
Esposito, Voices o f Resurgent Islam, 268-276; Ahmed H. Al-Maamiry, Economics in Islam (New Delhi:
Lancers Books, 1987), 1-18; and Mehmet, 4-7.

12
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The ideas prevalent in the writings of Muslim authors should not be surprising
given the legacy of economic activity in Islam. The society in which Islam emerged was
a trade-based civilization. In fact, at several times in history the Middle East was “one of
the commercial centres of the known world.”38 Eventually, trade even extended as far as
East Asia. Ozay Mehmet contended that this trade “financed high culture, learning as
well as public programs for income security” through such venues as a public welfare
fund and the distribution of charity through trusts and endowments.39

Social Justice
Thus, aside from references to profit, production and private property, Islam
places a great weight on social justice. This emphasis has been so great that Islam has
often been described as egalitarian and even labelled “socialist” in theory.40 John Thomas
Cummings, Hossein Askari, and Ahmad Mustafa asserted that “in Islam, capitalist
practices are acceptable only to the extent that they conform to overall social goals.”41
According to their analysis of Islam, if one segment of society were deprived of some
basic need, these needs would take priority over the “the economic desires of the
wealthy.”42

38 John Thomas Cummings, Hossein Askari, and Ahmad Mustafa, “Islam and Modem Economic Change,”
in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change (New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1980), 25.
39 Mehmet, 24-25.
40 Fazlur Rahman, “The Sources and Meaning o f Islamic Socialism,” in Donald Eugene Smith, ed.,
Religion and Political Modernization (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), 243-258.
41 Cummings, et al., 40.
42 Ibid., 40.
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Despite this emphasis on social justice, Rodinson argued against the notion that
Islam is closely linked to socialism in his book, Marxism and the Muslim World.42 As in
his earlier work on Islam and capitalism, he maintained that Islam is better-disposed to
capitalist practices than to socialist theories. Cummings et al. seem to agree with this
assessment when they write that “the common points [Islam] shares with Marxist
socialism are for the most part limited to attitudes about the past and present abuses of
capitalism that have outraged many adherents of socialism, especially relative to income
distribution.”44 This is primarily understood as the case because of the emphasis Islam
attributes to private ownership. Socialist theory which denies the right to private
ownership would be contrary to Islamic ideas.45
In any case, one of the ways that Islam emphasizes social justice is through the
requirement of zakat. Islam requires that every Muslim pay zakat - a proportion of their
net worth—to the benefit of the poor 46 Zakat functions as both alms for the needy and an
annual welfare tax consisting of 2.5 percent of the value of all accumulated wealth.47
Scholars differ on whether it is intended to serve as a compulsory tax or simply as a form
of devotion 48 However, during the early Islamic period, zakat was known to be used as a
wealth tax. At that time, zakat was kept in a central treasury and distributed for
43 Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, translated by Jean Matthews (New York and
London: Monthly Review Press, 1981).
44 Cummings, et al., 41.
45 Ibid., 38-42.
46 M. Umer Chapra, Islam and Economic Development: a Strategy fo r Development with
Justice and Stability. (Islamabad: International Institute o f Islamic Thought and the Islamic Research
Institute, 1993), 82-83.
47 Ayoub, 364.
48 Mehmet, 25.
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educational, civic, and social assistance purposes like caring for the orphans and needy.49
Essentially, zakat comprised a sort of fiscal policy that was used as a means of
redistributing income in classical Islam.50
In essence, while Islamic doctrine permits and even encourages economic activity
in what has been described as the capitalist sector, prominence is placed on ensuring that
these activities are conducted in a manner conducive to justice and equality. Rodinson
asserts, “For Islam the stress is laid rather upon the good use to be made of one’s
possessions, the merit that lies in expending them intelligently and distributing them with
generosity.” 51 Rodinson considers this attitude to be “favourable to economic
expansion.”52 The process of engaging in commerce and trade is governed by clear
guidelines as a means of enforcing the general welfare of the state.53 Thus, economic
activity is “endorsed only as long as it is harmonious with and strengthens the social
fabric.”54
As a result of Islam’s emphasis on social justice, Muslim theorists often call for
the introduction of a “just” alternative to social development. Islam, of course, functions
as the chief provider of this just alternative. M. Umer Chapra wrote an entire book
calling for and analyzing the notion of an Islamic economic strategy in his work entitled

49 Ayoub, 364.
50 Mehmet, 24.
51 Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, 108.
52 Ibid.
53 Cummings, et al., 39.
54 Cummings, et al., 40
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Islam and Economic Development: A Strategy with Justice and Stability.55 The primary
difference between the Islamic alternative and capitalist or socialist models identified by
Chapra is the necessity of implementing the moral element inherent in Islam. Chapra
asserted,
... material development with justice is not possible without moral
development. The rationale for this contention is that development with
justice requires an ‘efficient’ and equitable use of all resources and both
‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ can neither be defined nor actualised without the
injection of a moral dimension into economic pursuits.56
Moreover, other scholars have asserted that economic development will only occur in the
region if “a clear perspective and vision of Islamic values” is adopted.57 Muslim scholars
on a whole try to synthesize economics with Islamic ethics. Ahmed H. Al-Maamiry
followed this trend as well. He asserted that only Islam could provide comprehensive
development because it blended material development with spiritual development. He
illustrated how both capitalism and socialism fall short of meeting human needs in one
way or another. However, Islamic development is not limited to fulfilling certain human
requirements while leaving out others.58 Thus, he insisted that Islam takes all
developmental needs into account and does “not accept capital without guaranteeing
bread” nor accept socialist development guaranteeing bread but denying “freedom of
„ »59
expression.

55 M. Umer Chapra, Islam and Economic Development: A Strategy with Justice and Stability (Islamabad:
International Institute o f Islamic Though and the Islamic Research Institute, 1993).
56 Chapra, 7.
57 Muhammad Al-Buraey, Administrative Development: An Islamic Perspective (London: KPI Limited,
1985), 204.
58 Al-Maamiry, 151.
59 Al-Maamiry, 151.
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K. M. Azam took a slightly different road in his approach to the moral dimension
of Islamic economics. Discussing what he described as the “impetus of faith,” he did not
claim this faith had to be in Islam or even religious in nature for that matter.60 Rather, he
asserted that faith in general had a strong role to play in development. On one hand, he
did look to the “faith of Islam” to rekindle initiative and hope. On the other, he assumed
that faith could also comprise “manmade ideals such as Marxist philosophy or
parliamentary democracy and so forth.”61 Despite Azam’s more universal application of
faith, the general idea ascribing importance to Islamic belief within the confines of a
development model remains consistent with the ideas of other Muslim writers.
Sayyid Qutb was one of the most influential Islamic thinkers from the Arab world.
He primarily wrote from the 1940s to the 1960s. The impact he had during his lifetime
and on the generations following him makes his writings worth reviewing. His works
influenced the early years of the Society o f the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as
many other Islamic movements even to the present day. In his writings, he proposed
f\X

Islam as an alternative to communist, capitalist, hberalist and other secular models. He
wrote,
It becomes evident that Islam possesses or is capable of solving our basic
problems, of granting us a comprehensive social justice, of restoring for us
justice in government, in economics, in opportunities and in punish-

60 Azam, 13.
61 Ibid.
62 Yvonne Y. Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue o f Islamic Revival” in Esposito, Voice o f Resurgent Islam,
67-98.
63 Haddad, 67-98.
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m ent... then without doubt it will be more capable, than any other system
we may seek to borrow or imitate, or work in our nation.64

Despite his strong belief in implementing an alternative dictated by Islam, he did not
propose a return to early Islamic social practices. Rather, he contended that Islam was in
fact compatible with other models and forms of economic progress. He claimed, “The
Islamic model has room for scores of models which are compatible with the natural
growth of society and the new needs of the contemporary age as long as the total Islamic
idea dominates these models in its expansive external perimeter.”65 Hence, once again the
imperative of the Islamic ethic is presented.
In one of his translated works, Qutb specifically examined the stature of social
justice in Islam. 66 In this, he identified three foundational principles upon which he
claimed Islam establishes justice: (1) Absolute freedom of conscience; (2) the complete
equality of humans; and (3) the permanent mutual responsibility of society.67 Following
his analysis of these three principles he continued with a logical and systematic
exploration of Islamic guidelines for a just economic and political system. In all, he
concluded that while modem forms of development can be utilized, it is only through the
construction and implementation of an Islamic alternative that social justice and progress
can be realized in the Arab-Islamic world.

AS

64 Ibid,, 70, citing Sayyid Qutb, Maarakat al-Islam wa-al-Rasmaliyyah (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1975 (4th
printing)), 36.
65 Ibid, 71.
66 Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, translated by John B. Hardie (n.p.: Islamic Book Services, n.d., first
published by Cairo: Maktabat Misr, n.d. approximately 1945).
67 Ibid., 30-68.
68 Qutb.
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The Problem o f Interest and Investment
A final way proposed by Muslim writers to further the notion of social justice in
the Islamic alternative is Islam’s prohibition of riba, or usury. Despite this contention, it
is this very prohibition that is cited by many critics as a prime reason that Islam does not
provide a practical alternative to Western capitalist practices. Forbidding usury
essentially means that no form of interest can be employed.69 A restriction on interest
changes the very nature of investment as understood by the Western world.
According to Al-Buraey, riba is forbidden because it “is a form of oppression the rich take advantage of the poor and oppress them by extracting this unlawful extra or
surplus called interest.”70 Cummings et al further asserted that the rationale behind the
prohibition of riba is explicitly clear. In essence, it serves to decrease the tendency of
amassing wealth in the hands of a few. Moreover, in Islam wealth should be earned
through hard work and personal initiative, and not by the self-seeking motive compelled
by interest.71 Qutb also stressed the ills of interest. However, he set this apart from the
permission of giving and receiving loans. According to this differentiation, loans should
be provided as a means to “meet a need or to encourage production.”72 Thus, interest is
not gained on the loan but rather needy borrowers would repay when they are in better
circumstances, and production borrowers would repay once they have made a profit

69 Mehmet, 18-20.
70 Al-Buraey, 182.
71 Cummings, et al., 32.
72 Qutb, 122.
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through their own effort. The distinction between profit and riba was also expounded by
several other scholars. According to them, the difference was between the taking of
interest where no risk was involved and earning an economic return where risk is
involved. In this regard, no gain can be achieved without the presence of risk.74
Notwithstanding the above, there is some debate even in Muslim circles on
whether Islam really prohibits interest or whether the true meaning behind the restriction
was to prevent various ways of economic exploitation.75 In this regard, Mehmet asserted
that there is “evidence from the Prophet’s time supporting the view that riba refers not to
interest, but to usury in order to ensure fairness in financial transactions.”76 He also
argued that in contemporary systems where currency is exposed to inflation, Islam may
allow “indexation” at the same rate as inflation to prevent the depreciation of the value of
money and unfair losses.77
Overall, Muslim writers largely view the prohibition of interest as beneficial to
society. Qutb provides an all-encompassing summary of the raison d'etre behind this view
in the paragraph that follows:
Money should be loaned to those in need freely and without
interest; this is the way to increase affection, to benefit the sense of
independence, and to create a sense of mutual responsibility between rich
and poor, between powerful and weak. ... And the mere possession of
money does not entitle a man to make a profit out of it alone. It is the
borrower who must put out the effort, and therefore all profit resulting
from that effort should accrue to him who makes the effort; the capital of
73 Qutb, 122-123.
74 Cummings et al., 43 ; and Al-Buraey, 182-183.
75 Cummings, et al., 33.
76 Mehmet, 19.
77 Ibid.
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the loan should be returned alone, this is to say without interest, to its
owner. 78
Nevertheless, the restriction of interest is viewed by some as potentially hindering
development. By and large, the Western banking system has flourished because of the
imposition of interest rates on investments. The lack of interest in investment could
discourage the accumulation of savings and possibly encourage capital flight in search of
higher earnings on investment.79 In place of this though, there have been proposals
developed by Muslims as well as several initiatives undertaken regarding an Islamic
investment alternative.
The development and establishment of Islamic banking has been one such
initiative. These banks provide a practical alternative to interest-based investment for
» 80
Muslims. Many such banks have already been created across the Arab-Islamic world
and even in the West. The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) provides a good example of
such an institution. Established in 1973, the IDB aims to promote economic development
and provide an equity based investment alternative.

81

On the whole, Islamic banking operates through two key methods: (1) A
mudarabah contract, and (2) a murabaha contract.82 The former contract functions
something like profit-sharing. In this case, the Islamic bank takes a share of the business
when it lends money. Thus, the bank takes a share of the profits earned through the
78 Qutb, 122.
79 Mehmet, 19-20.
80 Al-Buraey, 198-200; and Cummings, et al., 33-34.
81 Ibid.
82 Charles W.L. Hill, International Business: Competing in the Global Marketplace, 4th edition.(New York:
McGrawHill Companies, 2003), 101.
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investment. On the other hand, when an individual wishes to deposit money in the bank,
their investment is essentially treated as an “equity investment in whatever activity the
banks use its capital for.” Thus, there is no set return on the investment. The second
contract offers a simpler method. In the case of a loan, the bank will directly purchase the
property or other asset from the seller. Then, the bank will mark up the price and sell it to
the borrower.84 While perhaps easier to implement, this last method can be criticized for
being significantly similar to interest-based banking. This form begs the question whether
it is really an Islamic alternative being sought after, or merely a substitute to
contemporary secular banking.
In all, the Islamic injunction for interest-free banking may pose the most difficulty
in terms of the creation of a globally compatible Islamic development model. However,
this problem is not insurmountable. Through efforts already discussed, various creative
measures have been undertaken to provide a alternatives that are operable in both Muslim
and non-Muslim nations alike. Moreover, it should be noted that the trend toward Islamic
banking is already underway and is even beginning to take root in a few Western
nations.85 In fact, the Telegraph recently reported on the creation of the first Islamic bank
in the United Kingdom. This bank will offer “current accounts, debit cards and consumer

83 Hill, 101.
84 Ibid.
85 Christopher Hope and Susannah Osborne, “Islamic law bank given go-ahead to open in UK,” [article
online] The London Telegraph, (posted August 9, 2004), available online:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtinl7xmWnews/2004/08/09/nbank09.xml
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principles and guidelines found in Islam as well as a significant body of literature that
could comprise an Islamic economic option. This paper discusses the various aspects of
an Islamic Economic Option (IEO). It looks at the compatibility debate, analyzes the
extent to which the IEO differs from existing secular models and constitutes a practical
alternative for the region. The basic theory guiding this research supports the idea that an
indigenously developed IEO could be both compatible to the global order as well as form
a practical alternative for the region.
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C h a p t e r 2:

The Arab State: A Question of Legitimacy

Throughout time, the Arab-Islamic world has enjoyed a collective sense of
identity. From Morocco to Egypt and from Saudi Arabia to Syria, nationals of each
nation consider themselves Arab. This bond, which transcends national boundaries, can
largely be attributed to a shared language and predominantly shared religion.91 Yet
despite these unifying factors, there is much diversity across the Arab-Islamic world.
Arab states range from those that are wealthy oil-producing states to those that are poor;
and from those that are semi-democratic states to others that are absolute monarchies.
Each of these states enjoys a sense of historical legitimacy based on past tribal, religious
or hereditary rule. It is important to understand the historical roots of Arab states in order
to fully understand the contemporary politics. Today, almost all states in the Arab-Islamic
world suffer from weakening legitimacy stemming from a lack of democratic practice,
economic insecurity, and/or foreign policies inextricably tied to those of the United States.
Arab regimes often point to a past linkage in order to legitimize their rule. This chapter
will discuss the question of legitimacy in the Arab-Islamic world. It will examine the
historic basis of legitimacy throughout the region, followed by the materialization of the
modem state system. Ultimately, it will look at the contemporary weakening of
legitimacy throughout the Arab-Islamic world.

91 Iliya Harik, “The Origins o f the Arab State System,” in Ghassan Salame, ed., The Foundations o f the
Arab State (London: Routledge, 1987), 19-20.
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Origins o f the Arab State
There are two main arguments surrounding the origins of the Arab state system.
On one hand, scholars contend that this state has “come to the Middle East as an
‘imported commodity,’ partly under colonial pressure and partly under the influence of
imitation and mimicry.” This school of thought maintains that the issue of the state is an
arbitrary one that was primarily a European invention. On the other hand, however, there
are those scholars who argue that while the borders between Arab states may be crafted
to a certain extent, many of the present-day Arab states have been in existence for
generations.93 In fact, both factors have played a role in the creation of the modem Arab
state system. With the exception of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, which
were divided amongst the Western powers as part of the Sykes-Pikot agreement, the
existence of the remaining states predates and/or is entirely unrelated to European
colonialism.94 As such, many of these states do not tie their legitimacy to external sources
of power, but to historic sources such as tribal rule, religion or hereditary leadership.
These historical bases of authority have emerged from a system underpinned by
ideology, traditions and dominion.95 Iliya Harik identified five categories of traditional
Arab states. Harik labelled the first of these categories as the imam-chief system. This
system was in effect primarily in areas outside the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire like

92 Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London and New
York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 21.
93 Harik in Salami, ed., The Foundations o f the Arab State, 19-22.
94 Ibid.; and Albert Hourani, A History o f the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press/Warner
Books Inc, 1991), 318.
95 Harik in Salame, ed., The Foundations o f the Arab State, 23.
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Oman, Yemen and Morocco.96 Authority was vested in a single sanctioned leader who
functioned as both a state and a religious leader. Oman provides a particularly interesting
case because Oman has the second longest history of statehood in the entire Arab world.
The state began in the eighth century as a split from the Muslim empire under the first
four khalifahs. However, Oman did not emerge as “a state by default, but rather [as] the
product of a conscious and determined effort to design a political system consistent with
the religious beliefs of the Ibadi Muslim faith.”97 This system was created in the belief
that to have legitimacy a leader had to be a pious Muslim elected by the people. In fact,
the Ibadi state constructed the freest principles of elections to be found in Islamic history
and political theory.98 However, like other tribal and religious leaders in the region, the
Ibadis eventually instituted hereditary rights to govern alongside the principle of popular
elections. Other examples of states in the imam-chief system also utilized hereditary
leadership. Thus, both Yemeni and Moroccan leaders traditionally justified their rule
partially by claiming descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad.99
The second traditional basis of authority is found in an alliance of political and
religious leaders. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia best illustrates such a coalition.
Approximately 260 years ago, a plethora of tribes were contending for control of the
Arabian Peninsula. A local chief, Muhammad ibn Saud, set up an alliance with religious
reformer Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. 'Abd Al-Wahhab subscribed to the Hanbilite
school of jurisprudence. He emphasized the leader’s imperative to employ Shariah and

96 Albert Hourani, A History o f the Arab Peoples (New York: MJF Books, 1991), 243.
97 Harik in Salame, ed., The Foundations o f the Arab State, 25.
98 Ibid., 25.
99 Ibid., 27-28.
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spread the faith.100 In this way the Al Saud clan expanded its control over other tribes and
successfully coalesced the Saudi state. Through this alliance, the Al Saud family was able
to institutionalize its traditional legitimacy.101
During the same period, other Arab states began arose through what Harik termed
the “traditional secular system of authority.”102 Under this system, religious power was
not exercised in any way, shape or form. Rather, leadership was associated with a tribal
chief who became ruler. Power remained vested in the family, and the descendents of the
ruling dynasty preserved control. Many of the present-day Gulf States such as Kuwait,
Qatar and Bahrain all belong to the traditional secular states which emerged in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.103 Although their system of authority was already in
place, the Arab Gulf states did not officially attain independence until the middle of the
last century.104
A fourth and equally significant type of Arab state is the bureaucratic-military
oligarchy.105 Most of these states came into existence under the auspices of the Ottoman
Empire. During the decline of Ottoman power, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania and Egypt
each manifested this type of leadership. Various local Ottoman garrisons individually
gained greater autonomy in their respective domains. With time, local leaders became
increasingly independent of Ottoman control. Eventually, these nations were governed
100 Harik in Salame, 27-28.
101 Hilal Khashan, Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism (Gainesville: University
Press o f Florida, 2000), 82-83.
102 Harik in Salame, 30-33.
103 Ibid., 30-33.
104 Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 132-133.
105 Harik in Salame, 33-35.
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independently; with power centralized in the hands of a few. Some nations adopted a
more dynastic power base, but others retained strictly military oligarchic control.
However, in a few cases oligarchic rule predates Ottoman rule. For instance, Egypt had a
central government from antiquity through to the Mamluk and the Ottoman dynasties.106
The final category of Arab states are those that have been strongly influenced by
colonial powers. The apex of the colonial mandate system was attained shortly after the
First World War.107 The decline of the almost 500 year-old Ottoman Empire created a
situation conducive to the influence of foreign powers. During the height of its power, the
Ottoman Empire had created a sense of unity across diverse ethnic groups spanning the
Middle East, North Africa and much of southeast Europe. However, by the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century the empire began to decline. The dominant hand of
a European presence in the Middle East was ultimately responsible for the weakening and
eventual abolition of the Ottoman Empire. Many areas were completely taken over by
European forces. A few examples include the occupation of Egypt by French forces
under the command of Napoleon in 1798; the French occupation of Algeria in the 1830s;
and the 1839 British occupation of Aden, a strategic entrance to the Red Sea. In addition,
in 1869 the French built the Suez Canal and by 1881 had occupied Tunisia. Britain
gained control of Egypt in 1882 and Italy occupied Tripoli and Libya in 1911.108
Moreover, colonial strength became even more visible following the Great War.
By joining sides with the Germans, the Ottomans sealed their fate. Once the war had

106 Ibid., 33-35.
107 Ibid., 37.
108 Hourani, A History o f the Arab Peoples, 265-285.
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ended, the remaining ‘divides’ of the empire were distributed between the French and
British under the League of Nations mandate system. Britain was given Iraq, Palestine,
and Transjordan, while France controlled Syria and Lebanon. Although most of these
Arab lands were promised some form of autonomy, only some were granted
independence. Ultimately, Britain and France decided on national boundaries, established
who would rule under what form of government, and determined what level of access to
natural resources and education would be available to the local population.109 It is evident
that this fifth category of Arab states emerged at the hands of the colonial powers. It was
not the sole product of historical forces that shaped many other Arab states.110
Through the above discussion it is reasonable to conclude that the origins and
, 'i

legitimacy of the Arab state can be predominantly linked to history. The Arab state
system has its own historical basis of authority. However, European forces during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries no doubt influenced the region and on the whole
reinforced the existing state system. In addition, indigenous forces such as nationalism
and religion also had a hand in shaping the political landscape of the region.

Sustaining Legitimacy in Modern Arab States
Contemporary Middle Eastern states comprise what has become known as the
Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. MENA nations include Algeria, Bahrain,
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab
109 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making o f the M odem Middle East, 2nd Ed., (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 10.
110 Harik in Salame, 38-39.
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Emirates, and Yemen.111 However, because the intention of this paper is to discuss the
Arab-Islamic world, the states of Israel and Turkey will be excluded because they are
neither Arab states nor Islamic states. These other states are largely authoritarian regimes
that can be categorized into three main forms.
(1) Monarchical states. These states can be further subdivided into oil-producing
and non-oil producing. They primarily include the Arab Gulf States, Morocco,
and Jordan.
(2) One-party states. These states include quasi-democratic governments like
those of Egypt and Yemen, as well as family rulers like the Al-Assad’s of
Syria.
(3) Other. This category includes Islamic states like Iran as well as democratic
experiments like Lebanon.

The Arab monarchies come in two main governmental forms, namely absolute
monarchies like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and
variations of the constitutional monarchic system, as in the cases of Bahrain, Jordan,
Kuwait, Morocco, Oman and Qatar. These two types of government differ little except
for the fact that absolute monarchies do not have any form of electoral process.
Nevertheless, while constitutional monarchies have limited elections in their parliaments
or have implemented a shura (consultative) council, all three remain largely authoritarian.
It is interesting to note that a constitutional monarchy in the Arab Gulf area is similar not

111 These states have been identified as belonging to the region from the collected works of James A. Bill
and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 5th edition (New York: Adison Wesley Longman, Inc.,
2000) and Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Middle East Regional System,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ed., The Foreign Policies o f Middle East States (London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2002), 29-53. Each o f these authors disagree on the inclusion o f some o f the nations. However,
by and large this selection of states are the nations that comprise the MENA.
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to the current British system, where there is a democracy nominally headed by a monarch,
but to the monarchies of the eighteenth century where the monarch had the real power.112
The one-party states are also predominately authoritarian in nature. Such a state
exists when one party or family dominates the political system. Usually, the ruling family
or party remains in power for so long that it becomes entrenched in the political
landscape.113 The duration of the Al-Assad family’s control of Syria illustrates this point.
In some cases, opposition is technically permitted but could never attain real power. In
the Middle East, several of these states operate under the pretence of democracy, but
possess questionable ballot results in elections. For example, Hosni Mubarak now boasts
twenty-four years in office as Egypt’s president, gaining 96% and 96.3% of the votes in
the 1993 and 1999 presidential referendums.114 Likewise, Ali Abdullah Saleh held the
office of president of the Yemeni Arab Republic from 1978 until the 1990 unification of
Yemen. At that time, Saleh assumed the position of president of the Republic of Yemen,
which he retains to this day.115
Two forms of states separate themselves from the authoritarian governments of
the monarchical and one-party states. The first of these is the religious state. The primary
and perhaps sole example of this type of state in the Middle East can be found in Iran.
While Iran falls somewhat outside the scope of this paper because it is a non-Arab
Middle Eastern state, its geo-political significance in the region makes it worth
112 Michael Herb, “Princes and Powers in the Arab World,” in the Middle East Journal, Volume 58,
Number 3 (Summer 2004), 367-370.
113 Tamara Sonn, Between Qur 'an and Crown: The Challenge o f Political Legitimacy in the Arab World
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 226.
114 Country Profile Egypt 2004 Main Report, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2005.
115 Country Profile Yemen 2004 Main Report, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2005.
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mentioning. Iran is an Islamic state based on the Shi’a branch of Islam. The Islamic
Republic of Iran was declared in 1979 at the apex of an Islamic revolution. Initially,
religious clerics wielded ultimate control. While predominantly authoritarian, Iran also
combines elements of democratic practice and socialism. State practice is claimed to have
derived from Islamic thought and/or Islamic law.116 Today’s Iran is undergoing another
stream of change as liberals and conservatives battle for political control through
electoral processes.
The second distinctive type of Arab state is Lebanon. Lebanon is an interesting
case because the nation is comprised of five major religious sects: Maronite, Sunni,
Shia’a, Orthodox and Druze. Considered a democratic experiment, the Lebanese political
system is based on a consociational form of democracy. It was initially designed as a way
of mediating community relations between the different religious communities of
Lebanon. In effect, it legislated a political role for each community as a way of
“integrating the country’s various major sects into the Lebanese political field.” 117
Despite its claim to being the most democratic nation in the Arab world, Lebanon’s
political situation remains fragile. Suffering from over a decade of civil war and a string
of political assassinations extending to the present, the success of Lebanon’s democratic
system cannot be overly lauded.
Most governments in the Arab-Islamic world struggle to sustain their claim to
legitimate rule. With the exception of Lebanon, almost all states in the MENA suffer
from weakening legitimacy stemming from a lack of democratic practice, economic
116 Mehran Tamadonfar, The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership: Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and
Pragmatism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 38-45.
117 Owen, 165.
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insecurity, and/or foreign policies inextricably tied to that of the United States. In order
substantiate their legitimacy, these states must rely on a variety of methods to support
their authority. At times, they have used Arab nationalism. At other times, they have
invoked nation-state nationalism. However, in the face of growing Islamic opposition,
leaders have resorted to accentuating their commitment to Islam while simultaneously
seeking ways to limit the movement of Islamic organizations.1,8 These tactics have
proven more difficult in the less wealthy and more democratic Arab states. However,
wealthier Arab states have had less trouble. In both cases, two main dynamics have
primarily been responsible for reinforcing the power of Arab leaders, namely external
sources of protection and oil profits.119
External sources of protection chiefly began to surface during the eighteenth
century when Britain began to exert power in the Arab-Islamic world. While the colonial
powers brought improvements in education, medicine, and agricultural and trading
methods, these changes usually surfaced at the expense of the local population.
Modernisation efforts often indebted Arab states to Europe. Hence, Europeans were able
to impose financial controls and sustain varying degrees of political domination. The
population was often denied higher education, elementary schooling was limited, and the
British or French occupiers determined what little profit would go to the locals from their
own industries and resources.

118 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 5* edition (New York: Addison
Wesley Longman, 2000), 59.
119 Owen, 58.
120 Hourani, A History o f the Arab Peoples, pp. 291-292, 302.
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In other regions of the Arab-Islamic world, and particularly in the Arabian Gulf,
European powers utilized other ways to control the region through trade alliances,
business deals and other means. By developing treaties with local tribal leaders, the
British were able to cultivate friendly ties that would secure their maritime, trade and
later oil interests in the area. At another level, these treaties served to institutionalize the
position of certain families. Rather than abide by the traditionally porous economic
regions, rigid and arbitrary borders were formed. These borders both restricted tribal
movement and provided a strategically powerful buttressing to the rule of specific
dominant families.121
Following the 1971 withdrawal of Britain from the region, the United States and
Saudi Arabia became sources of protection.122 Both players had strategic interests in the
area, mainly oil and control of the access to oil. While external sources may have been
partially influential in securing the rule of powerful families, the primary means of
consolidating power has been achieved through oil profits. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) was established in 1981 to secure indigenous control of the industry and address
economic and security concerns in the region. Grouping themselves into a network of
states, the GCC members were better able to guard themselves against the vulnerability
of being an isolated small state.123 A statement in the Working Paper for Joint Gulf
Action clearly identified this purpose:
The GCC shall attempt to provide the peoples of the region with real and
continuous growth, while at the same time it shall strive to protect peace,
121 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, 132-134.
122 Owen, 58.
123 Ibid and Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 151-153. See also Hilal Khashan, Arabs at the Crossroads:
Political Identity and Nationalism (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 91-93.
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security and progress. The basic issue is how to transform the oil
generated wealth into comprehensive and steady growth for the welfare of
the people of the region.12

Oil profits brought three main benefits to the ruling families. First, it freed the
governments from relying on the taxation of the local populace. Second, it equipped them
to distribute wealth among their families and all levels of their relatively small
populations. Finally, it allowed the families to gain significant popular support by
providing employment, loans, free health care, education and highly subsidized utilities
to their citizenry.125 Thus, these wealthier Arab states, primarily concentrated in the Gulf
region, have become known as rentier states - states that live off the income of a specific
resource, in this case, oil.126 Nevertheless, the ability of these states to attain their own
revenue without taxation necessarily infers that the population has little or no avenue for
representation or participation in the public sphere.

111

As the adage goes, there is no

representation without taxation. Consequently, the legitimacy gained by having a popular
voice reflected at different levels is lost to the rentier states.
Therefore, the legitimacy of leaders in the rentier states has been tied to their
ability to bequeath economic and social favours to prominent members of their populace.
Given a decrease in the financial capacity of these governments, a challenge emerges as

124 Emile Nakhleh, The Persian G ulf and American Policy (New York: Praeger, 1982), 47-48 cited in Neil
Quilliam, “The States o f the Gulf Co-operation Council,” in Tom Pierre Najem and Martin Hetherington
(ed.), Good Governance in the Middle East Oil Monarchies (London and New York: Routledge Curzon,
2003), 30.
125 Owen, 57-59.
126 Bill and Springborg, 59 and 315-316.
127 Ibid.
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to how social loyalty can be maintained.128 While some one-party states attempt to forge
their political legitimacy through dubious electoral processes, many Arab monarchies
have resorted to other devices. Primarily, they have focused on maintaining stability and
increasing economic growth to gamer legitimacy. A highly important method of
maintaining stability is through suppressing dissent. Thus, most of these governments
boast a strong security force. The security services in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are more
active than those of the other Gulf States. This is primarily due to the frequency of
opposition in these countries. However, the security services of each of these countries
closely monitor intellectuals, religious leaders and expatriates.129
Remaining ideologically flexible has also helped Arab regimes sustain power.
During the 1950s and ’60s when Arab nationalism was in vogue, they were able to
champion the Arab cause. In contemporary times, Islamic restoration movements are on
the rise. These movements claim that the establishment is too secular and therefore call
for a return to Islam. To counter this, Arab leaders show outward piety and
demonstratively declare their commitment to Islam.130 Today, playing the religious card
has proven to be one of the more successful ways to sustain power. Hence, some
governments attempt to establish a link between their regime and religion in order to
validate their right to rule. For example, the kings of Jordan and Morocco trace their
lineage to the Prophet Muhammad himself.

1 "3 1

While this lineage is not equivalent to the

128 Quilliam in Najem and Hetherington, 31.
129 Daniel 1. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, “The Enigma o f Political Stability in the Persian Gulf
Monarchies,” Middle East Review o f International Affairs (MERIA), Volume 3, Number 3 (September
1999), available online: http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/1999/issue3/jv3n3a3.html.
130 Byman and Green.
131 Owen, 47.
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divine right to rule used by the early Kings in Europe, it enhances leadership
qualifications.
Using another strategy, Saudi Arabia has aligned itself with Wahhabi
traditionalists to achieve a perception of religious legitimacy. By aligning itself with a
religious movement, the House of Saud hoped - unsuccessfully - to reduce opposition to
its rule on religious grounds. Thus, religion in Saudi Arabia serves as a means of social
control. For this purpose, Saudi Arabia employs the use of religious police (the mutawa),
government controlled shariah courts (courts based on Islamic law), and the Organization
for the Enforcement of Good and Prevention of Evil.132
There are other ways the single-party and family-ruled states seek to play the
religious card. These states are largely secular and maintain their rule without any
specific religious features.133 However, they maintain tight control of all that transpires in
their respective nations. Thus, they monitor religious institutions so closely that they are
often able to wield influence overtly or surreptitiously over religious activities. For
example, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, all religious literature, including
books, brochures, audio- and videotapes must first be approved by the Ministry of
Religion or Islamic Affairs (often referred to as Awqaf) prior to distribution.134 Most of
the Arab Gulf states have ministries with similar functions. In Kuwait, the Ministry of

132 Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and New York:
Routledge, 1993), 99-100; and Sonn, 213-216.
133 Harik in Salame, ed., The Foundations o f the Arab State, 24.
134 Learned during informal interviews and while perusing through publications while on a research trip in
the UAE and Oman, February 2005.

38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Awqaf is also responsible for hiring imams, khateebs (preachers) and muezzins.135 Friday
sermons are also monitored and/or even dictated. For instance, the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs and Awqaf in the UAE has both a “Supervision” and a “Preaching and Guidance”
division.136 Brandishing this amount of control over religious activities provides
governments with the ability to have fatwas (religious edicts) issued in support of
legislation or other actions, or even to “encourage” sermons that support or praise the
government.137 James Bill and Robert Springborg discuss this phenomenon in their work
on the Middle East. They describe what they call al-Islam al-rasmi (Establishment Islam),
official Islam that adheres closely to sacred texts and scholarly interpretations. At times,
this is used as a semi-official ‘state’ religion. In order to gamer legitimacy from al-Islam
al-rasmi, leaders offer imams favours and recognition of their religious status as a reward
for preaching sermons that emphasize obedience to authority and lend support to
government policies.138 Hence, silencing the voice of opposition is achieved by careful
co-optation of potential dissidents. Academics and religious leaders critical of the
government are often offered prestigious and high-salaried positions in exchange for
support.139 In this way, “the establishment ulema have contributed to the close
identification of al-islam al-rasmi with the government in control.”140

135 Dr Abdullah Maatouq Al-Maatouq, “Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (Awqaf),”
[article online], Kuwait-info.com (New Delhi: Kuwait Information Office, n.d.), available online:
http://www.kuwait-info.com/sidepages/state_ministries_awqafislamic.asp. Official website (in Arabic) can
be found at: http://www.awkaf.net.
136 “About Ministry o f Islamic Affairs and Awqaf,” Ministry o f Islamic Affairs and Awqaf, Official Website,
available online: http://www.uae.gov.ae/moia/. See also the Government o f Dubai’s Awqaf and Islamic
Affairs at http://www.awqafdubai.gov.ae/awqaf/vEnglish/showpage.jsp?objectID=556&lID=l.
137 Bill and Springborg, 42-45.
138 Bill and Springbord, 43.
139 Byman and Green.
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Despite these attempts to engender a sense of religio-political legitimacy, the fact
remains that most of the Arab-Islamic world still suffers from a lack of it. As such, one of
the key aspects played upon by the Islamic opposition is the legitimacy crisis. Because
these governments have forcefully attempted to suppress and control the relationship
between popular or colloquial Islam and the people, the rise of Islam has added “an
ideological dimension” which seeks to “restrict the power of the State.”141 In this sense,
religion can be a double-edged sword. On one hand, rulers use Islam as a means to
legitimize their actions. On the other hand, Islamic opposition movements use Islam to
assert the illegitimacy of these regimes.
Even though most Arab Gulf States have not been completely successful in
securing a legitimate basis for their own rule, one cannot doubt their success in sustaining
stability through the methods discussed above. Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green
have identified six strategies that Gulf governments use to maintain stability. These
include deploying strong security services, co-opting potential dissidents, adopting
divide-and-rule measures,

demonstrating ideological

flexibility,

allowing token

participation, and pursuing accommodative diplomacy.142 Byman et al claimed that,
Although the above six strategies are short-term palliatives, they have
helped keep the peace for many years. In and of themselves, the strategies
do not stop social modernization, revive stagnant Gulf economies, ease
demographic pressure or reduce corruption. They have, however, raised
the popularity of governments and diluted anger about foreign aggression.
Perhaps most importantly, regime tools hinder an organized opposition

140 Bill and Springbord, 43. (italics added)
141 Binder cited in Ayubi, Political Islam, 161.
142 Daniel 1. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, “The Enigma o f Political Stability in the Persian Gulf
Monarchies,” Middle East Review o f International Affairs (MERIA), Volume 3, Number 3 (September
1999), available online: http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/1999/issue3/jv3n3a3.html.
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and mitigate the politicizing events the often lead disaffected individuals
to become violent.143
Thus, these methods of maintaining stability have become key ways for the
government to gamer popularity with the local population. However, notwithstanding the
success of these methods, several scholars have predicted future problems stemming from
the need for both political and economic reform.144 Despite their fears, however, the
situation in the Gulf has remained largely constant, in part due to the rigorous
development programs undertaken in the Gulf area. While primarily developed by the oil
industry, several of the Gulf States have undertaken initiatives to develop other economic
sectors as well. At any rate, the Gulf States are highly developed and greatly pride
themselves in being the economic centre of the Middle East. It can be argued that GCC
states over-emphasize economic growth to compensate for the absence of political
growth.
Nevertheless, the future success of the rentier states is not contingent on their past
and present success and economic development. Indeed, relying, as they do, solely on the
rent from one resource is a hazardous policy that does not guarantee continued stability.
Because government revenue is dependent on the level of oil revenue rather than taxation,
development efforts are potentially unstable.145 Despite their best efforts to diversify their
economy, most rentier states have failed to develop vibrant alternative industries.
Furthermore, while oil revenues remain considerably constant, national populations

143 Byman and Green.
144 See both Byman and Green’s article and Bill and Springborg’s discussion o f the Gulf States.
145 Giacomo Luciani, “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization” in Ghassan Salame,
ed., Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal o f Politics in the Muslim World (London and New York:
I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 142.
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continue to grow.146 Larger populations will place a greater weight on the economy.
Moreover, the likelihood of an opposition movement obtaining power will substantially
increase should a dramatic economic downturn occur.147
One of the major problems of economic development in the Arab Gulf states is
the “failure of the ruling elites to recruit their nationals into the workforce.”148 Most Gulf
nationals limit their roles in the economy to entrepreneurial and managerial positions. On
the whole, they resist involving themselves in manual labour or any function related to
economic production. These roles are left to expatriate workers, primarily from South and
East Asian countries.149 Consequently, if an economic downturn resulted in the mass
flight of expatriate personnel, the Arab Gulf states would be ill-equipped to deal with the
realities of running all areas of the economy.
These caveats notwithstanding, the present economic situation in the GCC states
is largely positive. The capabilities inherent to a rentier economy have allowed most Gulf
leaders the ability to engender popularity and outright love and support from their
citizens. Wherever one travels throughout the Arabian Gulf, one is hard-pressed to find a
citizen not singing the praises of the nation’s leaders. Naturally, dissent is not often
voiced due to perilous consequences. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that outright
praise is not forced. The role of charismatic leadership, combined with the effectivenes of

146 Byman and Green.
147 Emmanuel Sivan, “Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Taking Over Governments,” Middle East Review o f
International Affairs (MERIA), Volume 2, Number 2 (May 1998), available online:
http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/1998/issue2/jv2n2a2.html.
148 Hilal Khashan, Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism (Gainesville: University
Press o f Florida, 2000), 75.
149 Khashan, 74-76.
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patronage, advanced the popularity of many Gulf leaders. The following account
tV i

provides one example: On February 6 , 2005, Sultan Qaboos returned to Oman from a
meeting with Sheikh Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid
Al Maktoum in the United Arab Emirates.150 Qaboos was due to return through the
Hatta/Sohar road border. Crossing into Oman just one hour before Qaboos’s scheduled
return, one could see clusters of Omanis lined up for miles along the road, waiting to
greet the Sultan upon his return.151 This demonstration of support was voluntary and
illustrates the public’s approval of their leader.
Hence it would seem that what “typically passes as semiofficial ideology in these
rentier states is a mix of Islam and loyalty to the ruling family, with a thin veneer of Arab
nationalism.” 152 Indeed, the leaders of the Gulf States have developed their own
legitimacy by cultivating a satisfied population. Accordingly, their denial of
representation for their citizenry goes unnoticed. As a result of the populations’
satisfaction with the government and overall good economic well-being, there is a lack of
engagement in civil society. In fact, rentier states “have sought to depoliticize their
populations and to prevent the spread of political ideologies, which they perceive as
potential challenges to their power and legitimacy.”

1 ST

These states have succeeded to

such an extent that they have fashioned a populace that is at most complacent and at least
disinterested in politics.

150 “HM, Sheikh Muhammad hold talks,” The Times o f Oman, Vol. 30, No. 344 (February 7, 2005), 1; and
“His Majesty on two-day visit to UAE,” The Oman Tribune, (February 6, 2005), 1 and 3.
151 Seen first hand during visit to Oman in February 2005.
152 Bill and Springborg, 60.
153 Ibid., 60.
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To provide a semblance of political inclusion, many Arab rulers, and particularly
Gulf leaders, hold various types of consultations with the people. These range from
informal talks to meet-and-greet gatherings and other forms of public meetings. They
serve to undergird regime claims that the rulers listen to the voices of their people.
During these meetings, the people are able to convey their concerns and complaints.154
The personal contact with the mling families “gives a general sense of common identity
between the rulers and the ruled,”155 and demonstrates the accessibility of the leaders to
the people. Thus, by providing minimal access, Arab rulers avoid the complete political
alienation of their citizenry.
More recently, many of the rentier states have adopted piecemeal economic and
political reforms as a way to address the limitation of their political and financial capacity.
By implementing minor reforms, they are able to accommodate both internal and external
pressures. For example, in 1992 Saudi Arabia introduced the Basic Law as a means of
appeasing both liberal and Islamist elements of their society.156 As a way of controlling
and/or appeasing opposition, many governments take “the form of arrangements that give
oppositionists a voice in parliament or even the cabinet, and may also involve a process
of Tslamization’ by which the state cedes some ideological and institutional control to
Islamists.”157 In this fashion, some states have found it in their interest to offer token
participation through semi-democratic parliamentary processes or shura (consultative)

154 Byman and Green.
155 Ibid.
156 Quilliam in Najem and Hetherington, 31.
157 Daniel Bloomberg, “Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap o f Liberalized Autocracy,” in The
Journal o f Democracy, Volume 13, Number 4 (October 2002), 57.
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councils.158 Kuwait, Oman and Qatar are among the states that have adopted a Majlis al
Shura, or consultative council. In February 2002, Bahrain became a constitutional
monarchy and adopted a national charter.159 By the fall of the same year, the Amir of
Bahrain appointed a consultative council.160 A final example of these token political
reforms can be drawn from Kuwait. Kuwait distinguishes itself from other Gulf States in
that it has political associations, organizations and labour unions, each of which
contribute to a blossoming civil society. Moreover, there are a large number of informal
gathering places where Kuwaitis congregate to discuss politics. In a significant
development in May 2005, Kuwaiti women were granted the right to vote and stand in
parliamentary and local elections.161
Despite minimal liberalization, most states in the Arab-Islamic world maintain a
tight hold over their populations. To justify the authoritarian nature of the state, many
Arab regimes use the Islamists to instigate fear. They claim that the presence of Islamists
obliges the state to keep a close reign over their populace. In fact, it could be argued that
Arab rulers need the Islamists because they “are a fear-arousing card.” 162 Conversely,
some scholars have suggested that monarchism is necessary, and perhaps even desirable,
for democratization to ensue. According to Michael Herb, these scholars argue that

158 Byman and Green.
159 Quilliam in Najem and Hetherington, 31.
160 Byman and Green.
161 “Kuwaiti women win right to vote,” BBC News (May 17, 2005) Available online:
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/4552749.stm
162 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Islam and Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East,” Shireen Hunter (ed.),
CSIS Briefing Notes on Islam, Society and Politics (Vol. 6, No. 1, April 2004), 16.
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monarchism facilitates democratization by ensuring the mutual security of the system.163.
This argument basically reinforces the notion that the Islamic opposition is indeed a
threat. Therefore, it is beneficial to have monarchic systems in place to minimize the risks
related to democratic transition by maintaining the mutual security of the system.164 For
this reason, Western circles do little to encourage democratic development in the Arab
monarchies. Where Arab monarchies are closely aligned with the United States, the
inclusion of Islamic or other populist movements into the power structure poses a risk to
Western interests.
The Arab world is one which is varied. While tied together by a common
language and history, it is separated by different political forms and economic situations.
Politically, Arab nations range from one-party states and monarchies through to unique
democracies like Lebanon. In addition, the region has experienced a variety of economic
development models - socialism during the time of Nasser, minimal to extensive rentier
economies and various other exercises in market capitalism. On one hand many nations
in the region are suffering economically, while those with strong oil economies face the
prospect of economic instability. On the other hand, political uncertainty is always just
below the surface. This uncertainty begs an assessment of what would happen if the
establishment collapsed and the strongest opposition force in the Arab world - the
Islamists - were to come to power. Most Islamic opposition movements advocate
establishing Islamic governments and implementing religious practices. If they came to
power, what sort of development strategy would they follow? The next chapters will
address these very questions.
163 Herb in the Middle East Journal, 370.
164 Ibid.
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C h a p t e r 3:

The Opposition

Throughout the Arab-Islamic world, politicized Islam has taken many forms, from
Islamic republics like Iran, to illegal opposition groups to Islamic movements working
within existing political and social structures. The prevalence of these movements and
political expressions of Islam has sparked an intense discussion of the beliefs and goals of
these groups among scholars and policy-makers around the world. For the most part, the
aspirations of the Islamic opposition are primarily fashioned by certain issues and
experiences categorized as follows: the experience and history of colonialism and
western penetration, perceptions of a lack of legitimacy of existing leadership, the
suppression of religious and political expression, and a weak civil society. There are
different forms of Islamic opposition movements. Similar to other belief systems, Islam is
multifarious and open to a variety of interpretations.165 Thus, there are radical strains
evidenced by the Taliban of Afghanistan and Al Qaeda, moderate Islamic groups like the
Ikhwan al Muslimeen (The Muslim Brotherhood), as well as more liberal varieties that
participate in political, social and economic aspects of their respective nations.166
Overall, there is no consensus among Islamic thinkers and leaders on what
constitutes true Islamic practice or political and economic contentions. This is why there
has been such a wide variety of expressions of political Islam. Unfortunately, it has
165 Tom Pierre Najem, “Good Governance: The definition and application o f the concept,” in Tom Pierre
Najem and Martin Hetherington (ed.), Good Governance in the Middle East Oil Monarchies (London and
New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 21.
166 John Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers Ltd., 1997), 4.
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principally been the more radical elements that have grabbed headlines and instilled fear
in much of the world. Opposition is more often than not comprised of responses that are
more of a reaction to the existing situation than a well thought out response that would be
equipped to deal with the realities of running a state or economy. As shown in chapter
two, ideal Islam may pose a viable development alternative for the region. However,
Islamic opposition movements have failed to detail practical solutions. The reason for the
failure to propose a desirable alternative may partially stem from the inability of most
Islamic groups to work within an existing system. On one level, this inability is usually
state-imposed, as most governments wish to restrict the movement of groups that could
form their strongest potential opposition. While minor reforms have been implemented in
a number of states to allow opposition seats in parliament, many states in the region have
used the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to suppress and/or eliminate their
opposition.167 On another level, the inability to work within the system can also be selfimposed as some of the more radical or traditionalist movements do not wish to
participate in modem political systems. Consequently, many Islamic movements have
been pushed to the fringes of society where their movement, growth, and learning are
substantially marginalized and/or hindered. As a result, the proposals arousing from these
movements are often coloured by the experience of being the ‘underdog.’
From this marginalized position, many of these groups call for the implementation
of Islamic practices in society and/or the establishment of an Islamic government and
legal system. With the legitimacy of many regimes being called into question, it is
interesting to consider the outcome of an Islamic group attaining power. Those who

167 Esposito, Political Islam, 1-6.
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follow the politics of the region are apprehensive of such a change. Would an Islamic
government mean another Iran, Sudan or Afghanistan? This chapter will look at the
Islamic opposition. The first part of this chapter will provide a background on the history
of ‘liberal’ Islamic thought and show how the development of this thought during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has affected contemporary opposition
movements. The final portion of this chapter will discuss a selection of contemporary
opposition movements with an emphasis on the Muslim Brotherhood.

History o f Modern Islamic Thought: Reaction and Reform
Islamic thought, like ancient Greek and Christian thought, was best developed
when the institutions and political environment about which it spoke were in decline. For
example, some early Islamic ideas, like the “caliphate theory” can be traced back to the
•

•

•

•

time when the Abbasid dynasty, as a caliphate institution, was deteriorating.

1 fiR

Many

other Islamic notions and ideologies can be traced to rough political times. In the first
chapter of his book on Political Islam, Nazih Ayubi provides a lengthy description of the
origins, theory and practice of the Islamic state.169 Essentially, Ayubi contends that it is
simplistic to consider modem radical ideologies of either Shi'a or Sunni Islam as the
official fundamentalist beliefs of the branch. Rather, he suggests that it is important to
look at the historical contexts from which these ideas emerged. Regrettably, a detailed
discussion of the history of early Islamic thought is beyond the scope of this paper.

168 Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and New York:
Routledge, 1991), 8.
169 Ibid.
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However, in order to reasonably comprehend modem Islamic movements, it is essential
to review modem Islamic thought of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
If history is our teacher, then monitoring developments in Egypt may truly be a
guide to what is to come in the rest of the Arab Middle East. Egypt seems to be at the
forefront of religious dissemination and political change in the Arab world. Many of the
great Arab-Islamic thinkers emerged or were spread from Egypt. Their works have
shaped contemporary Islamic thought and have laid the foundation for both secular and
Islamist voices of opposition. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were marked by the
remembrance of an age of great Islamic empires. Islamic civilisation, once a pinnacle of
pride, now seemed a historic concept. Foreign powers had moved in and apprehended the
balance of power. With the Ottoman Empire in decline and local economies in shambles,
many feared that ‘the political world of Islam’ was in jeopardy. The following excerpt
from Maxime Rodinson’s Marxism and the Muslim World accurately captures the mood
of the time.
.. .on the political level, the Ottoman Empire was being slowly eaten away
by the European powers, increasingly controlled and supervised and
placed under trusteeship as the ‘sick man.’ Ideologically, this process
seemed to mark the triumph of European (Christian or materialist) values
over the indigenous Muslim values.
The feeling this aroused in the peoples of the Ottoman Empire,
masses and elite alike, was one of humiliation, all the deeper and more
bitter in that it came after a feeling of superiority. The humiliation was
naturally accompanied by hatred and distrust of Europe, an intense desire
for liberation and revenge that expressed itself in exultation whenever
Europe was defeated ...17
The protracted Arab world’s subjugation under European colonial powers nursed
deep-rooted bitterness against foreign domination. Moreover, the overall humiliation of
170 Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World (New York and London: Monthly Review Press,
1981), 210-211.
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being ruled by foreign powers as well the fear of the possible loss of Islamic identity
evoked various responses. One type of response was expressed through violent
movements, as evidenced by the events leading to the 1860 civil war in Lebanon.171
However, the best illustration of these responses can be found in the evolution of Arabic
political thought among intellectuals during this time. These responses included a number
of developments in Arabic political thought that focused on either greater Islamic
traditionalism, more secular trends, or on an in-between approach that advocated the
feasibility of adaptation to modem living with simultaneous adherence to Islamic
practices.172 The following five men really paved the way for liberal Islamic thought as
well as laid a significant foundation for many Muslim opposition movements today.

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani
Usually considered the father of Islamic modernism and perhaps the forerunner of
liberal Islamic thought, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897)173 emerged as a voice for
this middle road. During the greater part of the twentieth century, his thought affected
many Islamic thinkers. Throughout his life, he lived and travelled in many different
places, including Iran, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, as well as Europe. In each place he
became politically active, mainly through lectures and written publications. Overall, AlAfghani’s effort met with little success during his life. However, his work lived on

171 Albert Hourani, A History o f the Arab Peoples (New York: MJF Books, 1991), 277.
172 For a detailed discussion on the historic background surrounding the weakening and fall o f the Ottoman
Empire see Albert Hourani’s A History o f the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University PressAVamer
Books Inc, 1991), and Chapter 1 of Roger Owen’s State, Power and Politics in the Making o f the Modem
Middle East (London: Routledge - Taylor and Francis Groups, 2000).
173 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 108.
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through his disciples, becoming an important component of any study of Islamic political
thought during this era.
Many treatments of al-Afghani’s life discuss the long-standing controversy
surrounding his ethnic origin and, consequently, his religious identity. On one side of the
controversy stand Al-Afghani’s own claims to be from Afghanistan, and therefore part of
Sunni Islam. The other side maintained, however, that Al-Afghani was Persian and hence
Shi'a. This debate is significant because the reception of Al-Afghani’s message was
contingent on his origin in both the Sunni and Shi'a worlds. Possibly stemming from his
own pan-Islamic ideals, Afghani had a vested interest in reaching the larger part of the
Arab, and Sunni, world. His seeming deliberate ambiguity on his origins may have
evolved from his desire to ensure the appeal of his message.
Some Middle Eastern scholars have suggested that the allegations of Al-Afghani’s
Shi'a Iranian root stem from his opponents. Wishing to undermine the potency of his
message, they stressed Al-Afghani’s Shi'a religious identity despite his claims that he
was an Afghan, and, by extension probably Sunni. The debate becomes further muddled
by the assertions of other scholars who assert Al-Afghani’s indisputable Persian roots and
Shi'a religious training.174 Thus, the controversy continues, with academics of the day
still disputing Al-Afghani’s origin. However, it appears that a majority of scholars now
concede that Al-Afghani was in fact Iranian. Nevertheless, Al-Afghani’s own aims seem
to have been successful, as he is known by his alias Al-Afghani.

174 To read further into the contending arguments on Afghani’s origin refer to: Albert Hourani’s Arabic
Thought in the Liberal Age and Nikki R. Keddie’s, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, Political and
Religious Writings o f Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1968).
Keddie was a leading scholar and apologist o f Iran and the Muslim world, whose opinions would naturally
favour a Persian identity for Afghani.
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As discussed earlier, the political environment in which Al-Afghani lived was one
that fostered a variety of political and ideological responses. The decline of the Ottoman
Empire and the European domination of the region prompted Islamic thinkers to focus on
the appropriate Muslim response to the changes. Many thought that the general
population was estranged from Islam, and feared ideological infiltration from a largely
secular Europe. During this era, Al-Afghani offered one such Islamic response to the
region’s growing concerns. Throughout his life, Al-Afghani emphasised the necessity of
a return to the moral framework of Islam, while embracing changes brought by Western
technology. He thought it possible to “delineate an alternative to Western secular
adaptationism on the one hand and religiously motivated rejectionism on the other.”175
This balancing act pervaded Afghani’s life. Through his lectures and writing he sought to
respond to the threat of Western secularism, as well as tame the traditionalists’ outright
denunciation of modernisation. He argued that, properly used, reason would not interfere
with religious revelation but would complement it. In his rejection of taqlid (blind
imitation/traditionalism), he spoke against blind acceptance of Quranic interpretations.
Hence, he called for reform in Islam and a reopening of Ijtihad,176
At the same time, however, Al-Afghani was unceasing in his cries for a removal
of foreign colonial rule. He called for the Muslim world to bond together and resist
western encroachment. He “strove to galvanise Muslims into strong pan-Islamic fervour
175

John Esposito, Islam - The Straight Path, Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), 126.

176 Ijtihad could be defined as independent reasoning and/or the act of Islamic Councils interpretation of the
Quran and Sunnah into accepted meaning and Shariah law.
To read more on Afghani’s ideas with regards to his double rejection of taqlid and secularism, as well as
his pan-Islamic ambitions and beliefs refer to Chapter 2 o f Nikki Keddie’s, An Islamic Response to
Imperialism, as well as Chapter 3 o f Kenneth Cragg’s Islamic Surveys 3 - Counsels in Contemporary Islam
(Edinburgh University Press, 1965).
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and action” 177 as a catalyst towards unity and contingent release from Western
domination. John Esposito summarised these ambitions saying that “in Afghani’s holistic
interpretation of Islam, the reform of Islam was inseparably connected with liberation
from colonial rule. The reassertion of Muslim identity and solidarity was a prerequisite
for the restoration of political and cultural independence.”

178

Hence, Al-Afghani urged

the masses to reject foreign control, while simultaneously exhorting the religious and
political elites to reform Islam.
Overall, Al-Afghani upheld religion as the foundation of civilization, claimed
Islam’s agreement with science and rational thought, and asserted Islam’s superiority to
other religions. In contrast with Islam’s intellectual appeal, he saw Christianity as
irrational and based on beliefs that people agree to without understanding. Therefore, he
asserted that when Europe was most Christian it was most backward (in reference to the
‘Dark Ages’), whereas the Muslim community was most advanced when it was most
Muslim. Hence, he thought that the primary reason the Muslim world was weak was
because it had strayed from Islam, whereas the Christian West was strong primarily
because it was no longer truly Christian. Thus, Al-Afghani placed the blame for the
weakness of the Muslim world on the shoulders of Muslims themselves. He stressed the
importance of a return to their roots as well as reform in Islamic understanding. To drive
his point home, he used the Qur’anic adage, “Verily, God does not change the state of a
people until they change themselves inwardly.”179 Only if internal change takes place can

177 Kenneth Cragg, Islamic Surveys 3 - Counsels in Contemporary Islam, 33.
178 Esposito, Islam - The Straight Path, 128.
179 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s citation o f the Qur’an verse 13:11, The Truth About the Neicheri Sect (18801881), in Keddie, 173.
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strengthening occur, and consequently release from the subjugation to European
powers. 180
Despite all his effort to initiate reform in the Islamic world and free it from
European control, Al-Afghani passed away before ever realizing his ambitions.
Notwithstanding his lack of success, however, the works of Afghani lived on after his
death. In fact, Al-Afghani was the inspiration behind both the creation of the Muslim
Brotherhood as well as nationalist movements.

Muhammad Abduh
The most significant of Al-Afghani’s followers in the Arab world was probably
the Egyptian, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905)181. Afghani and Abduh met in Cairo
during Abduh’s studies at al-Azhar. Abduh was intrigued by Afghani’s activism and
desire to bring about a revival of Islam and liberate Muslims from colonialism. Abduh
shared many of Al-Afghani’s views on the situation of European subjugation and also
advocated unity in the Islamic world as a method of removing foreign control.

1ft?

Thus,

the beginning of Abduh’s life mirrored that of Al-Afghani’s. He went from being a
student to working as a political activist and writer, eventually spending years in exile.
Upon his reestablishment in Egypt after exile, Abduh moderated his earlier activism. By
the end of his life, he focused more on educational and religious reform rather than on the
overthrow of the established order. However, his attempts at religious reform, especially

180 See Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 125-129.
181 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 130-160.
182 Ibid.; and Cragg, 33-36.
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at Al-Azhar, met with great resistance. Hence, like his mentor Al-Afghani, Abduh’s
impact was greatly limited during his lifetime, but increased as years went by.

1R1

Abduh’s origins are not as ambiguous as those of Al-Afghani. Abduh was raised
in a village near Tanta. He began receiving religious education from the time he was
thirteen years old and eventually went on to study at Al-Azhar, probably the greatest
centre of religious learning in the Islamic world. Following completion of his studies at
Al-Azhar, he obtained teaching posts at Al-Azhar and Dar al-Ulm.184 These positions
provided him with the opportunity to speak and write on political affairs. Abduh’s
political activism during this early stage of his life greatly reflected the ideas of Afghani.
Hence, it came as no surprise that when Afghani was exiled from Egypt in 1879, Abduh
was removed from his teaching posts. Soon after, however, Abduh found another venue
for expressing his political ideas, and began publishing articles in the newspaper, AlAhram. Nevertheless, Abduh’s promotion of pan-Islamic and nationalist movements as
1R^

well as his criticism of European intervention in Egypt soon led to his own exile.

Leaving first for Lebanon, Abduh later went to Paris, where he joined his teacher Afghani
Together they collaborated on a number of projects, including the publication of the
weekly Al-Urwa al Wuthqa. The weekly was short-lived, however, and Abduh returned
to Beirut. While in Lebanon, he delivered lectures on theology which later formed
important components of his famous book, Risala al-Tawhid (The Theology of Unity).186

183 Keddie, 3 and 44; and Sonn, 164.
184 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 130 - 132.
185 Ibid., 132-134.
186 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 134-135. To read more about Abduh’s Risala al-Tawhid,
refer to Cragg’s Counsels in Contemporary Islam, 36-41.
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Even though many of Abduh’s ideas seemed to naturally complement Afghani’s,
they did not always agree. After some time, Abduh broke with Afghani altogether. It
seemed that Abduh lost faith in his earlier political activism and came to the conclusion
that political protest was futile without reform from within. Thus, Abduh tried to separate
religious reform from politics and refocused his energies on educational and language
development initiatives. His change of mode was not unnoticed, and he was soon allowed
to return to Egypt. Once back in Egypt, Abduh pursued a career in the public service and
took a variety of leadership positions, such as judge and administrative council member
of Al-Azhar. By 1899 Abduh was appointed Grand Mufti of Egypt, the head of the whole
system of religious law and its interpretation. From this post, Abduh was able to realize
some of his reform ambitions in Islamic law, administration and education.187
The foundation for Abduh’s thought, similar to that of Al-Afghani’s, focused on
the problem of inner decay and the need for inner revival.188 Abduh attributed the
problem of European encroachment to internal factors that prevailed throughout the
Islamic world. These internal problems stemmed from an inability to adapt to modem
times. Islam, he contended, is fully compatible with scientific discoveries and rational
understanding. It is “not a religion of conflicting principles but is built squarely on
reason . . . enjoining rational procedure and intellectual inquiry into the manifestations of
the universe.” 189 He argued that among all religions, Islam differentiated itself by its

187 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 134-135.
188 Ibid., 136.
189 Esposito, Islam - The Straight Path, 129.
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rational and logical appeal. Therefore, it followed that the Islamic world was not weak
due to its religion, but due to the lack of a true understanding of its religion.
Abduh thought that the ways of the Islamic world were not based on Islam as it
had been intended, but rather on a variety of practices and systems from other social or
cultural influences. These practices were not attuned with the modem world. Thus, while
he maintained that the moral principles and laws of Islam must prevail, he also believed
their original intentions should be looked at and reinterpreted for the contemporary era.190
Abduh aimed to bypass the restraint of traditionalism. He advocated returning to the
original Islamic sources and employing independent legal reasoning to develop Islamic
thought appropriate to address the challenges posed by the modem world.191 Hence, like
Afghani, Abduh rejected taqlid and stressed the significance of ijtihad. The following
clearly highlights Abduh’s central argument:
First, to liberate thought from the shackles of taqlid, and understand
religion as it was understood by the elders of the community before
dissension appeared; to return, in the acquisition of religious knowledge,
to its first sources, and to weigh them in the scales of human reason, which
God has created in order to prevent excess or adulteration in religion,. . .
religion must be accounted a friend to science, pushing man to investigate
the secrets of existence, summoning him to respect established truths, and
to depend on them in his moral life and conduct.192
Thus, Abduh asserted that all texts on religion and law were open to question and critique.
With the exception of the Qur’an, which was unchangeable and faultless, the other texts
should be reinterpreted for modem times. Hence, ijtihad was necessary for all religious
understanding, including (with reservation) Qur’anic injunctions. Abduh also thought that
190 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 136-141; Cragg, 35-42.
191 Najib Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1997), 26.
192 Abduh cited in Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 140-141.
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almost the entire system of law and education had to be reformed in order to make it
compatible with modem times. Thus, while he was Mufti, he attempted to revise and
change a large proportion of the curriculum at Al-Azhar as well as set up an
administrative council. These endeavours met with much opposition from both religious
conservatives and secular leaders.
Much like his mentor Al-Afghani, Abduh has his share of modem critics. One of
these critics, Charles Kurzman, hesitates in using the term ‘liberal thinker’ to describe
Abduh. According to Kurzman, Abduh superficially appeared liberal because of his
embrace of Western technology and curriculum. However, Kurzman saw Abduh’s ideas
as a liberal “strain” that only accommodated modernity.193 In terms of religious thought,
Abduh claimed that while ijtihad should be open, its practice should be limited to
“competent religious scholars.” 194 Overall, Kurzman was critical of viewing Islamic
liberal thought with limitations as real liberalism. Other critics, such as Johannes Jansen,
share this view. These critics seem to contend that Islamic liberalism or modem Islamic
thought cannot be truly liberal because it is Islamic. According to this notion, being a
modernist or a liberal reformist automatically adds up to rejecting Islam.195
Nazih Ayubi disagrees with this assessment. While he concedes that much of
Abduh’s discussion of reform was prompted by a technologically advanced West, he
argues that the limitations over the advancement of rational liberal thought were not a

193 Abdou Filal-Ansari, “What is Liberal Islam? The Sources o f Enlightened Muslim Thought,” Journal o f
Democracy Volume 14, Number 2 (April 2003), 24; available online: http://80muse.jhu.edu. webvoy.uwindsor.ca:2048/joumals/joumal_of_democracy/v014/14.2filali_ansary.pdf
194 Filal-Ansari,, 25.
195 Ahmad S. Mousalli, The Islamic Questfo r Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights (Gainesville:
University o f Florida, 2001), 10-11.
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result of an inflexible religious tradition, but rather due to the delayed and deficient
development of indigenous industry and capital progress.196 Indeed, evidence suggests
that Abduh scrutinized Islamic traditions in light of modem science and theories. His goal
was to interpret Islam to fit the modem age. In so doing, he aimed to make “science the
highest authority of interpretation, understanding and action;” and “Islam a force for
civilization and morality.”197
Overall, Abduh’s work became a catalyst for other reform attempts among many
of his contemporaries and followers. Any change that may have taken place at Al-Azhar
and even in all of Egypt since Abduh’s death can usually be traced back to his influence.
Abduh’s span of influence reached both secular and Islamic movements. Among his
prominent followers linked to liberal thinking are Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid, Qasim Amin,
Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, Sa'ad Zaghlul, and Ali 'Abd Al-Raziq.198. Abduh’s closest
disciples were the Egyptian reformer Ali 'Abd Al-Raziq and the Syrian reformer
Muhammad Rashid Rida. 'Abd Al-Raziq’s liberal ideas influenced nationalist
movements in the twentieth century; while Rida spoke for the Salajiyya199 movement,
deeply influencing Sayyid Qutb, Hasan Al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood.

196 Ibid., 58-59.
197Mousalli, 11.
198 Ibid., 54-55.
199 Salafiyya is an Arabic term derived from the word salaf, meaning to “follow” or “precede.” It is used in
reference to the companions o f the Prophet Muhammad. Salafiyya ideas assert that religious authority can
be obtained directly from the Qur’an and hadiths. They advocate the examination o f early Islamic practices
and an interpretation for their implementation today. To understand more where their ideas derived from, it
would be useful to review the literature consulted in this paper discussing the thought o f twentieth century
Islamic thinkers. Moreover, a brief definition can be found in the following document:
Febe Armanios, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” Congressional Research Service
(CRS) Report fo r Congress, Report RS21695 (The Library of Congress, December 22, 2003); available
online: http://www.comm.comell.edu/als481/readings/crs-salafia.pdf
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Ali “Abd Al-Raziq
It has been said that the doctrines of Muhammad Abduh underwent particular
changes at the hands of his disciples.200 Accordingly, if Rashid Rida was attributed with
pushing Abduh’s ideas sharply down the conservative trail, then Ali 'Abd al-Raziq
(1888-1966)

“701

certainly gave them a secular flavour. An early modernist from Egypt,

'Abd Al-Raziq was primarily concerned with the nature and role of the Caliphate in
Islamic society. In accordance with being a disciple of Abduh, 'Abd Al-Raziq naturally
built upon his work. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that Abduh would have approved of the
secularism inherent in 'Abd Al-Raziq’s work. In fact, 'Abd Al-Raziq’s main thesis,
namely that there was no basis for the Caliphate in either the Qur’an or hadith, caused an
uproar among even liberal Islamic scholars and certainly among the conservatives.
Nevertheless, despite all the opposition 'Abd Al-Raziq faced as a result of his ideas
concerning the separation of religion and state, his work provided contemporary scholars
with a significant contribution to studies on Islamic governance.
Ali 'Abd Al-Raziq, whose father was a political associate of Muhammad Abduh,
was raised in Egypt. 'Abd Al-Raziq graduated from Al-Azhar and then went on to study
at Oxford University. He embraced a secular approach to politics and called for the
separation of religion and politics.202 While much of 'Abd Al-Raziq’s thought built upon
Abduh’s work, it had been a few decades since Abduh’s death. Thus, 'Abd Al-Raziq
thought that new solutions were required for the political issues that had arisen. These

200 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 226.
201 Ibid., 183.
202 Ibid., 183.
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new political issues stemmed from the tumultuous time which followed the end of the
First World War. The 1922 Turkish revolution, in which Mustafa Kemal had abolished
the sultanate, had set up a spiritual caliphate. However, by 1924 the Turkish National
Assembly had also annulled the caliphate. These occurrences led to much debate over the
position and necessity of the caliphate in Islam.

Orthodox Muslims contended that the

caliphate was necessary for Islamic government, and in 1926 the “Congress of the
Caliphate” met in Cairo and reaffirmed this contention.204 On the other hand, some liberal
scholars thought a caliph who was limited to spiritual control was entirely suitable. The
1925 publication of 'Abd Al-Raziq’s controversial book, Al-Islam wa usul al-hukm: ba ’th
fi al-Khalifa wa ’l-hukuma f i al-Islam” (Islam and the Basis of Political Authority: A
Study of the Caliphate and Government in Islam), was a contribution to this debate.

In

it, he claimed that all governments should be run on secular lines, without any
interference from religious authorities. Unfortunately, the storm of condemnation that
followed his publication had serious repercussions for 'Abd Al-Raziq’s life. It led to his
removal from his position of judge and teacher at Al-Azhar and forced him into private
life where he quietly published a few more writings.206
The opposition to the ideas expressed in 'Abd Al-Raziq’s book was compounded
by his overall suggestions that seemed to refute centuries of Islamic belief. 'Abd AlRaziq made two bold claims, one which contended that there was no need for the
203 Cragg, 69-71; and Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 183.
204 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 184.
205 William E. Shepard, “Muhammad Sa'id Al-'Ashmawi and the Application o f the Shari'a in Egypt,”
International Journal o f Middle East Studies, 28 (1996), 39; and Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal
Age, 183.
206 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 188-189.
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caliphate and the other which claimed that the mission of the Prophet Muhammad was
purely spiritual. He asserted that the Prophet had never intended to create a caliphate, and
that this institution had been invented because the Prophet’s death had left a gap that
needed to be fulfilled by a symbolic figure. Hence, his assertions essentially discredited
the foundations of authority present throughout the historical era of Islamic
civilisation.207 However, 'Abd Al-Raziq suggested that his ideas did not imply that Islam
accept secularism, but rather that the lack of specificity in the Qur’an was intended to
make the message of the Qur’an universal and adaptable to people all over the world at
all times.208 Thus, while 'Abd Al-Raziq may have been the leader of the more liberal
religious and non-religious circles, he earned criticism from them as well.
The impact of 'Abd Al-Raziq during his lifetime may have been limited due to the
outrage inveighed against his book. Nevertheless, his ideas provided the groundwork for
further investigation into Islamic methods of governance. While the leading thinkers of
the time may have denounced his rejection of the caliphate, the issues he raised
stimulated a debate that has carried on until the present time. In fact, contentions that
Muhammad was a prophet and not a political leader and that Islam was a religion and not
a political system still provokes outrage in many Muslim circles.209 Nevertheless, the
secular nationalist movements which swept the Arab world in the middle of the twentieth
century utilised ideas derived from the thought of 'Abd Al-Raziq.210

207 Cragg, 70-72; and Shepard, 39.
208 Mehran Tamadonfar, The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership: Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and
Pragmatism (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989), 37-38.
209 Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions o f Democracy,” Middle East Report (Massachusetts: Middle East
Research and Information Project, July-August 1993), 4.
210 Moussalli, 53-55.
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Muhammad Rashid Rida
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935)211, a Syrian-Egyptian thinker, primarily
built upon the foundation of Abduh’s ideas. However, he developed into a more
conservative theorist than his mentor Abduh and was the antithesis of 'Abd Al-Raziq.
Later in his life, he became influential in the revival movement that influenced the
Muslim youth of his time. He was the founder and publisher of the periodical Al-Manar.
Following the Great War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic world
became consumed with the issue of the Islamic Khalifah (caliphate). During this time,
Rida’s ideas became increasingly critical of the Western world, and he advocated the
essential nature of the Khalifah?n
Rashid Rida was bom in Tripoli, part of Ottoman Syria. Like many young people
then, he received an Islamic education. During his studies, he learned of Afghani and
Abduh’s Urwa al Wuthqa. Greatly attracted to this work, he even considered joining
Afghani. Rida later met with Abduh on several occasions and eventually became
Abduh’s devoted follower and biographer.213 Rida left Syria for Cairo by 1897, where he
could better deliver his and Abduh’s ideas. By 1898, Rida released the first issue of his
periodical, Al Manor, which encompassed much of his life. Through this publication,
Rida sought to help Muslims formulate an intellectual response to the problem of

211 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 224.
212 Moussalli,, 13.
See also, Esposito Islam - The Straight Path, 130-132.
213 Eliezer Tauber, “Three Approaches, One Idea: Religion and State in the Thought o f 'Abd al-Rahman alKawakibi, Najib 'Azuri and Rashid Rida” British Journal o f Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 21, Number
2 (1994), 195; and Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 226.
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reconciling religion with the modem world. In it, he disclosed personal reflections from
his spiritual life, wrote about doctrine, and commented on current events in world politics.
On the whole, Al Manar served as an “organ of reform” that advocated the ideas of
Abduh.214 Rida also used the publication as a vehicle for publishing his Commentary on
the Quran, Tafsir Al Manar. Despite all this, Rida’s Syrian ethnicity kept him at the
periphery of Egyptian politics. His involvement was restricted to publications, in which
he proposed a return to the original principles of Islam as a solution to the
‘backwardness’ of Muslim countries. Rida advocated the consultation of rulers with
religious leaders in formulating government policies, and also urged the emulation of the
scientific and technological progress of the West.215
Rida’s understanding of Islam was based on the Hanbali madhab, 216 which
stressed the unchanging nature of Islam. Rida differentiated between what belonged to
the essence of Islam - the Qur’an and hadith, and what did not - an accumulation of
practices that had grown up across the Arab-Islamic world. He thought that Muslims
often placed themselves under unnecessary restrictions that were not sanctioned by
religion but rather by tradition. He noted that some people defended these traditions as
though they were defending the core of the religion itself. Rida thought this dogmatism
and adamancy in non-core matters of religion contributed to the stagnation and disabled

214 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 226.
215 Tauber, 195-196; and Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 227.
216 In Islamic jurisprudence, there are four madhabs, or schools of jurisprudence. Hanbali is usually
considered the most conservative o f the four. Febe Armanios, “The Islamic Traditions o f Wahhabism and
Salafiyya,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report fo r Congress, Report RS21695 (The Library of
Congress, December 22, 2003); available online: http://www.comm.comell.edu/als481/readings/crssalafia.pdf
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modernisation of the Islamic world.217 Hence, like Abduh, Rida pleaded for Ijtihad,
stressing Islam as a religion based on reason. He contended that Islamic shariah law was
founded on the basis of ijtihad, and without it the Islamic state would further disintegrate.
Rida asserted that the Islamic world was in poor condition because it had lost the truth of
its religion. True Islam, he declared, demands two things: first, acceptance of the unity of
God (Tawhid), and second consultation (shura) in matters of state. Rida claimed that
rulers, in the interest of maximizing their power, have tried to make Muslims forget the
necessity of shura by encouraging them to abandon belief in the unity of God.218 Hence,
faith in Islam waned, leaving rulers to act according to their own interests without
accountability to a true understanding of Islam.
In his discussion of law, Rida presented the need to create a legal system which
people could really follow in the modem world. He thought a truly Islamic political
system was necessary to create equitable and applicable law. Rida claimed that true
Islamic law should be based on consultation between the ruler and the religious
interpreters of law. In order for this to take place, two things were essential - real ulama
and a true khalifah (caliph). While he conceded that he did not think it possible to unite
the entire Islamic world under one caliphate, he thought the caliph should function as a
spiritual head and leader of ijtihad for the Islamic world.219 Taken as a whole, Rida
advocated the establishment of a progressive, liberal and tolerant Islamic state. He

217 Ibid., 231-234.
218 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 228.
219 Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), 102;
and Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, 239-240.
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pictured the restoration of the caliphate ruled by a wise and just leader who would
practice ijtihad before forming and executing decisions.220
During his life, Rida remained politically active and carried on the ideas of Abduh.
He began playing a large part in Syrian politics in the later years of his life. He
participated in the wartime negotiations with the British, served as president of the Syrian
Congress in the 1920s, and was a member of the Syro-Palestinian delegation in Geneva
in 1921 and the political committee in Cairo during the Syrian Revolt of 1925-26.221
Nevertheless, in spite of Rida’s activism, his full impact was not felt until a number of
years after his death, when his various writings and recorded speeches became more
widely known. In fact, Hasan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, had
frequented a number of Rida’s gatherings during his youth. The ideas that Al-Banna
gleaned from Rida greatly influenced the Brotherhood. Through this transference, the
legacy of Rida lived on in the Brotherhood.222

Sawid Outb
Sayyid Qutb (1906 - 1966) was bom in Musha, a small Egyptian village in the
province of Asyut. His early life was typical; like many others Qutb left his village in
pursuit of education and employment in Cairo. In the capital, he grew concerned with
issues of poverty and injustice. It was during this time, the late 1940s, that Qutb began his
career as a writer on political, religious and economic issues.223 As mentioned in Chapter

220 Husain, 112.
221 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 227.
222 Ibid., 360.
223 Ayubi, Political Islam, 136-137.
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two, Qutb wrote about social justice in Islam as well as capitalism.224 He also wrote about
many other socio-political issues of interest to academics of the time. Thus, Qutb became
a fruitful writer, authoring over twenty-four books, an interpretation of the Qur’an and
many articles in prominent magazines such as al-Risalah.225 His life took a few rather
sharp turns over the years. In the beginning, his writings seemed to reflect quite liberal
thought well attuned to Western trends. Later, he advocated searching for truth from
internal sources and returning to Islam to solve the problems of the nation. However,
following his long imprisonment after joining the Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (The Muslim
Brotherhood) his writings became increasingly radicalized.
Originally, Qutb was somewhat smitten by the West. Like many others, he
admired its technological and economic advances. However, by the late 1940s, Qutb
began to change his tone. The effects of Britain’s war policies during the Second World
War, coupled with the creation of the state of Israel, had disenchanted Qutb. He felt the
West had rejected the Arabs’ right to self-determination and consequently rejected their
equality with the Western man.226 From 1948 to 1951 Qutb resided in the United States to
study educational administration. His visit seemed to further solidify his dislike and
bitterness toward the Western world. During his stay, he had encountered so much
materialism, bigotry and pro-Zionist sentiment that he felt alienated from Western culture
and the Western world as a whole.

‘j 'y n
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It may have been his visit to the United States or it may have been just further
disheartenment at the plight of the Arab world, but Qutb began a more active and critical
look at the state of the Arab-Islamic world. He started moving further away from his
earlier liberal tendencies. He dedicated his time to writing about Islam as an alternative
ideology to liberalism, secularism and capitalism for the Arab world.228 He was strongly
influenced by the works of Muhammad Asad and Abu al-Ala Mawdudi. Much of what
they had written before his time, he continued with an Egyptian flavour. While he
advocated the pursuit of a distinctly Islamic model, he did not totally disregard the
contribution of other models. In fact, early on he suggested that an Islamic system had
room for other models that were compatible with social growth.229 In all, he advocated
Islam as the solution to the predicament of the Arab world. Qutb was concerned with
developing an Islamic system to follow rather than purely emulate existing Western
models. He started with the assumption that Muslims have an authentic civilisation and
tradition of their own. They could therefore look internally to their civilization to find an
authentic journey of their own, or they could “borrow ready-made models” without
criticism or assessment.230
Upon his return from the United States, Qutb began contributing literature to the
Ikhwan Al-Muslimin. He later joined the group, and in 1953 was appointed editor-in-chief
of its weekly publication.231 He published a lot of material promoting the notion of Islam
as a solution. Qutb eventually came to be regarded as the leading theorist and writer of
228 Haddad in Esposito, Voices o f Resurgent Islam , 69-70.
229 Ibid., 70-71.
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the Brotherhood after the death of its founder, Hasan Al-Banna. While the Brotherhood
had helped facilitate the Free Officers’ 1952 revolution, they had a falling out a few years
later. Instead of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, the real leader of the Free Officers, the Ikhwan
had backed General Nagib, a figurehead. As a result, the brotherhood was banned by
Nasser’s regime. In October of 1954, a member of the brotherhood shot at Nasser. This
incident triggered a government-initiated series of arrests and executions.232 In 1954,
Qutb, along with many other members of the Brotherhood, was imprisoned. Released
shortly thereafter, Qutb was arrested once more later that year and accused of working
with a secret military wing of the brotherhood. He was sentenced to fifteen years in
prison. 233
The torture and humiliation suffered by Qutb during his time in prison left its toll
on him. While in prison, he continued to write materials for the Brotherhood. As time
wore on, his work grew increasingly rejectionist.234 He was “transformed from extreme
liberalism to utmost radicalism.”235 Through his writings he lashed out at the world. He
was released after ten years behind bars, but the physical and mental torture he had
endured left lasting scars. In his later years, he rejected and condemned all forms of
government that did not conform to what he perceived was a true Islamic system. His
ideology assumed a dogmatic character. In fact, his last book was so controversial that it
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resulted in his arrest in 1965. On August 22, 1966, he was executed. Even today, many
consider Qutb a martyr of the Islamic revival.236

Hasan Al-Banna and the Ikhwan al-Muslimin
A great deal can be said about those attracted to Islamic reformist and revivalist
movements. They are usually from disadvantaged elements within society. Both welleducated and uneducated people attracted to these movements have been excluded in one
form or another from the benefits of political access and social affluence.237 The story of
Hasan Al-Banna (1906 - 1949) provides one such example.238 Al-Banna began his career
as a poorly paid schoolteacher from the city of Isma'iliyya in Egypt. However, he soon
came to be known as the founder of the Ikhwan al Muslimin, the Society of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Al-Banna founded the movement in 1928, around the time that Islamic
revivalism was taking root across Egypt and around the rest of the Arab-Islamic world.
During this time, Islamic movements were becoming popular because the masses saw
them as “a means of overcoming the social injustice they believed to be perpetuated by
the secularists in control of the state.”239 They also saw it as an alternative to Western
pre-eminence.
Al-Banna was concerned with two main issues: the nature of God’s governance
and the removal of social injustice. He emphasized the importance of Islamic leadership
and the removal of elements deemed ‘un-Islamic.’ He can be credited with reviving the
236 Haddad in Esposito, Voices o f Resurgent Islam , 77-78.
237 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle E a st, 5th Ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley
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notion that the legitimacy of the government be tied to Islam. However, while he was
interested in the ‘Islamization’ of the government, he did not advocate the forceful
annexation of power.240 Moreover, Al-Banna was equally concerned with social justice.
His ideas began with premises similar to the teachings of Rashid Rida and the ideas of the
Salafiyya movement.241 He spoke about a return to the principles of the Qur’an, a
restoration of Islamic values, and the reform of individual and social morality.242 In
particular, Al-Banna stressed the need for social welfare programs and land reform. He
was concerned with localizing investment and other capital ventures away from foreign
direction. Nonetheless, much of his thought focused on Islamic government. However,
according to Al-Banna, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood was not an exclusively
political organization:
You are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local
organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the
heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur’an ... When asked
what it is for which you call, reply that it is Islam, the message of
Muhammad, the religion that contains within it government, and has as
one of its obligations freedom. If you are told that you are political,
answer that Islam admits no such distinction. If you are accused of being
revolutionaries, say, ‘We are voices for right and for peace in which we
dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against us and our
message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your
• • • 243
injustice.
The charismatic nature of Al-Banna was evident in many of his speeches. Within its first
years of existence, the Brotherhood quickly spread to many parts of Egypt. In 1933, Al240 Mousalli, 65.
241 Armanios, CRS Report Online.
242 Ira M. Lapidus, “Contemporary Islamic Movements in Historical Perspective,” Policy Papers in
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Banna was transferred from his teaching post in Isma’iliyya to Cairo. He used his transfer
as an opportunity to expand the reach of his movement. As the Egyptian government
became more aware of the magnitude of the Brotherhood’s scope, Al-Banna and some of
his colleagues were arrested. They were released soon after. The arrest compelled AlBanna to become more politically involved. He decided to run in the election. However,
he was asked to withdraw by powerful officials in exchange for permission to publish and
circulate his literature.244
Al-Banna and the Ikhwan can point to several years of peaceful writings and
involvement in the existing political system. However, as Egyptian society grew
increasingly dissatisfied with the leadership of the Egyptian monarchy, the Brotherhood
began stressing the need for political change. In the late 1940s, some became violent in
their protest against the government. As a result, the government began to implement
increasingly repressive measures against the group and all potential opposition as a
means of maintaining its hegemony. By 1949, the government had gone one step further
and arranged for the assassination of Hasan Al-Banna.245 He has lived on as a martyr of
the Islamic cause. Shortly after Al-Banna’s death, Sayyid Qutb emerged as the spiritual
leader and chief writer of the Brotherhood.
Eventually, the Ikhwan joined with the Free Officers Movement, who aimed to
overthrow the government. Once the Free Officers had successfully toppled the
monarchy in 1952, the Ikhwan assisted them in maintaining law and order as they set up
the new government. Once in power, the Free Officers’ leader Gamal Abd Al-Nasser
244 Mousalli, 65.
245 Richard Schifter, “The Clash o f Ideologies,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 15, Number 3 (Summer
2004), 17.
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soon excluded the Brotherhood from the government and turned his back on the Islamic
principles that were advocated by the Brotherhood.246 By and large, Nasser’s government
followed a secular nationalist approach to government. They wished to bypass the
influence of Islam in pursuit of secular policies. Hence, Nasser enacted strong
government efforts to limit Islamic groups. He eventually outlawed the Ikhwan AlMuslimin altogether.247 Overall, the isolation of the Brotherhood from the political realm
only served to solidify the member’s resolve. While they may have been temporarily
pushed underground, they did not lose touch with the pulse of the nation.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the popularity of the Brotherhood decreased. This
was partially the result of repressive government measures to quiet the Brotherhood’s
calls for an Islamic state. However, it was primarily due to the fact that Nasser’s
nationalism seemed to offer the same things as the Brotherhood, only with tangible
results. Nasser offered “dignity, unity, popular participation, defiance of the West, and a
semblance of socio-economic justice.”248 The secular-nationalist model was working for
the people. They were proud of the accomplishments of Nasser, rejoiced in his success at
removing much European control, and were quick to rally around his calls for Arab
unity.249
The triumph of the nationalist movement began to decline in the late 1960s.
Consequently, support for the movement and its leadership began to subside. First, the
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socialist experiments in land reform as well as the nationalization projects carried out by
Nasser did little to reduce the inequalities among social classes. Second, the prospect of
Arab unity began to look bleak. The union between Syria and Egypt had fallen apart, and
subsequent unification attempts met with ill-success. Finally, the dream of resisting Israel
and liberating Palestine from occupation was set back by the devastating failure of the
June 1967 war. This defeat signalled a turning point in Arab history.250
Nasser’s sudden death in 1970, combined with the failures of secularism and
nationalism, served to disillusion the population. According to Albert Hourani, the 1967
defeat did not just denote a military defeat, but an obstruction of moral judgement. The
Arab Muslims began to question the reason behind such a swift and public humiliation.
An assumption was drawn that the defeat and lack of prosperity in other regards could no
longer be blamed solely on external factors such as Western intervention. The evident
deficiencies had to be tied to an inner form of moral decay and a rejection of moral and
religious values imperative to the success of society. The tide was turning away from
secular nationalism and directing people from all social strata to return to Islam.

/}

c1

Dining this national transformation, the Ikhwan Al-Muslimin was once again able
to gain a stronger foothold throughout the nation. From the changing mood of the
populace, and the works of the Islamist movements, emerged two main strains. On one
hand, some began advocating a return to Islam but suggested compromise with the
existing leadership. They hoped that in return for allegiance to the government, they
would be afforded some degree of influence over policy. On the other hand, there were
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those advocating adherence to the Qutb’s later works, stressing the uncompromising
adoption of an Islamic government and society. According to both strains, only Islam
offered a solution to their plight. Most of the older leadership of the Ikhwan discarded the
notion that they should actively struggle to establish a complete Islamic state. They
continued to adhere to their original position that preaching about Islam would encourage
nominal Muslims to commit themselves more fully to religious beliefs and practices.
Inner commitment would inevitably lead to a better society and government.
Consequently, a few spin-off organizations developed out of the Brotherhood.
These organizations adopted a more radical oppositional stance against the government.
Once such group was the Jama ’at Al-Muslimin (the Society of Muslims), under the
direction of Shukri Mustafa.253 The implications of the beliefs espoused by such groups
were wide-reaching. The government was continuously on guard against the possibility
of protest, violence or attempted coup d'etat. This was not just the case with Egypt; the
same held true throughout much of the Arab-Islamic world. The tightened leash on the
growth and movement of Islamic movements served to fuel resentment and enrage the
more radical elements. Many were prepared for violence. The assassination of Anwar
Sadat in 1981 and the attempted overthrow of Hafiz Al-Asad in Syria in 1982 illustrate
• 254
this reaction.
However, during the Sadat days the government began to ease up on the Muslim
Brotherhood. By doing this, Sadat hoped to strengthen the base of his support. He freed

252 Ibid and Joel Beinin, “Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an
Egyptian Social Movement,” The New Centennial Review, Volume 5, Number 1 (Spring 2005), 118.
253 Beinin, 118.
254 Hourani, A History o f the Arab Peoples, 445-446.

76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

many of the imprisoned members of the Ikhwan and did not prevent the publication of a
weekly magazine, al-Dawa (The Call). However, neither Sadat nor his successor Hosni
Mubarak granted full legal recognition to the Muslim Brotherhood. During the early
years of Sadat’s reign, militant Marxist student groups captured much of his attention.
They were openly critical of his policies and more specifically his failure to free the Sinai
Peninsula from Israeli control. To quell this campus dissent, Sadat delegated individuals
to encourage the formation of Islamic student groups on campuses. By the mid-1970s,
these groups had become much more prominent then the Marxist groups. Many of the
students joined moderate groups while others were attracted to marginalized groups that
felt disadvantaged by society. These latter groups committed acts of violence. Some have
even been linked to the radical al-Jihad movements allegedly responsible for the
assassination of Sadat. Much of the literature and other available evidence does not
establish any direct connection between these violent groups and the Ikhwan. However, a
number of the radical members of these groups were at some point members of the
Brotherhood.255
Mubarak aimed to carry on Sadat’s balancing act with the Islamists, but he
attempted to do a much better job. Rather than being over-accommodating and
encouraging the creation of Islamic groups, as Sadat had done before him, and instead of
the hard-line policies of Nasser, Mubarak attempted to create a middle road. While he did
initiate a wave of arrests against anyone assumed to be connected with the assassination
of Sadat in the early 1980s, he also tried to lessen the animosity toward the government.
Hence, Mubarak released some long-held members of the Brotherhood from jail. He also
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clearly differentiated between radical and moderate Islamic groups. In this manner,
Mubarak aimed to isolate the violent elements from the mainstream Islamic movement.
Therefore, he tolerated such groups as the Brotherhood and to a limited degree allowed
them into the political system. While the Ikhwan itself remains technically illegal, it is a
known fact that many of its members serve as independent parliamentarians. In exchange
for being tolerated, however, these members of parliament are known to vote with
Mubarak’s own New Democratic Party (NDP) and likewise support Mubarak in
presidential referendums.256

Contemporary Islamic Movements
Contemporary Islamic movements owe much to the Muslim Brotherhood and the
thought of Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. In fact, many of today’s movements
borrow from the works of all of the previously discussed Islamic thinkers. While there
has been an abundance of other Islamic thinkers throughout history, such as Abu Hamid
Muhammad A1 Ghazali of the eleventh century, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Tamiyyah and
'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun of the thirteenth century, and Muhammad ibn 'Abd alWahhab of the eighteenth century, this paper only discusses a selection of prominent
twentieth century ‘liberal’ thinkers.257 These more recent thinkers have undoubtedly
paved the way for both revivalist and reformation movements throughout the last century
and up to the present time. In order to understand the emergence of the Islamic opposition,
it is important to understand these modem thinkers, how they were affected by the
256 John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam,” Harvard International
Review, Volume 24, Number 4 (Winter 2003), available online:
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/?id=1048&page=7.
257 Hourani, A History o f the Arab Peoples, 1-7,143, 144 and 257-258; and Muhammad Mahmoud Rabi,
The Political Theory o f Ibn Khaldun (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967).
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political climate of their day, how this was interpreted into their works and finally what
their legacy and experience has meant for those around them.
Over the last few decades, Islamic movements have appeared all across the
Middle East North Africa (MENA) and the greater Islamic world in the form of both
reactionary and reformist movements.258 The reformist movements generally stress two
aspirations, namely revival and renewal. Revivalist thought preaches about a return to
and revival of early Islamic society and practices. Renewal discusses the need for inner
change and a personal return and dedication to Qur’anic precepts. Together, they call for
a return to the sources of the Qur’an and the Sunna, with emphasis on the importance of
ijtihad of these sources in their application to society.259
From the 1970s until the present time, branches of the Ikhwan Al-Muslimin
appeared in many different Arab nations. To some extent, this growth can be accredited
to the rise and subsequent decline in oil wealth from the 1970s to the 1980s. The initial
success of Egypt and Syria in the 1973 war temporarily boosted the popularity of their
regimes and renewed the commitment to Arab unity. The oil-producing states joined
sides and used an oil embargo against Western nations. The price of oil skyrocketed and
significantly increased the wealth of the leaders of these nations. While in most cases the
newfound wealth was not distributed equally, it was useful in subduing the population
and postponing dissent. However, the lack of equal distribution and the sharp decline in
oil prices in the mid-1980s, combined with continued social and political alienation,
served to enhance the appeal of the Islamic opposition. This was especially true in
258 Rodinson, Marxism in the Muslim World, 210-211.
259 John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” in Esposito (ed.), Voices o f
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nations with a minimal supply of oil. Thus, the proliferation of the Ikhwan Al-Muslimin
and other Islamic groups during the 1980s and 1990s should not be interpreted as a
surprising development.
Around this time, other Islamic movements were materializing in addition to the
growing Ikhwan Al-Muslimin in nations all across the Arab-Islamic world - among them
Algeria, Iraq, Jordon, Syria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The inspiration behind the
proliferation of Islamic movements can be traced to the effects of the neighbouring
revolution in Iran. The 1979 ousting of the United States’ backed Shah and the arrival of
the new Islamic leadership marked a turning point for Iran and indeed the political
climate of the entire Middle East. The Islamic Revolution in Iran installed a Shi’a Islamic
government that operated under the rule of the ulama (clerics). This type of clerical
system utilized the theory of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who became the supreme leader of
post-revolution Iran.261 The intricacies of the revolution are beyond the scope of this
thesis. However, it is important to recognize the effect the Islamic revolution had on the
neighbouring Arab-Islamic world. Iran was the first country in the modem age to have a
popular revolution that resulted in the successful installation of an Islamic government.
Many people were inspired by the fact that an Islamic system had risen to power. As a
result, Islamic movements garnered greater attention.262 If an Islamic system could be
realized in Iran, the same could be true for other predominantly Muslim nations.
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The Ikhwan Al-Muslimin in Syria began to become particularly active in the late
1970s. Syrian leader Hafiz Al-Assad made the political mistake of supporting the
Maronites against the Palestinians in Lebanon. This, combined with the economic
downturn of the early 1980s, aggravated the population and encouraged Brotherhood
partisans to join together. This was not the first time for the Brotherhood to form in Syria.
The organization was actually launched in the late 1930s, but was suppressed in the
1950s and 60s. Initially, the Ikhwan merely urged the government to implement Islamic
practices into the administration of the State. However, Al-Assad’s Ba’athist party
comprised a secular nationalist government. Aside from formally conceding that Islam
was the official religion of Syria, it did not implement other Islamic practices. Members
of the Brotherhood continued to push for change and openly criticize the Ba’athist regime.
Increasingly, the government began using repressive measures against the Islamic groups.
These measures, coupled with the problems of the 1980s, resurrected the Brotherhood’s
base of support. The government tightened its reign over the people. This resulted in
incidents of violence between Islamists and Al-Assad’s government. The government
eventually outlawed membership in the Brotherhood altogether, and made it punishable
by death. In 1982, a series of demonstrations by members of the Brotherhood and others
government opponents were met with a serious military onslaught in which
approximately two thousand (2,000) people were killed.263
Similarly, the Islamic opposition was becoming visible in a variety of MENA
states. In Saudi Arabia, a nation that is allegedly very Islamic, one might not expect
significant opposition to occur. Yet, the tone throughout the region was already set in

263 Ayubi, Political Islam, 90-94; Sonn, 184-186 and Husain, 208.
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motion. Opposition in the Kingdom became glaringly obvious on November 20, 1979.
On that day, a group of several hundred men led by Juhayman bin Muhammad Al'Utaybi and Muhammad bin ' Abdallah Al-Qahtani took control of the Sacred Mosque at
Mecca.264 Al-'Utaybi and Al-Qahtani were remnants of an Arabian puritanical Sunni
movement known as the Ikhwan. This Ikhwan is not to be confused with the Ikhwan AlMuslimin discussed earlier. Rather, this group can be traced to the Arabian Peninsula
around the turn of the twentieth century. Originally, the Ikhwan were followers of
Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the Arabian reformer of the eighteenth century, whose
thought on Islam is attributed with shaping the Wahhabi265 doctrine prevalent in Saudi
Arabia. It was comprised of a variety of nomadic groups spread across Peninsula. These
bands of men were instrumental in facilitating the unification of Arabia under the AlSaud family.266 Once instated, the Saudi monarchy quickly turned against the movement.
As a result, the Ikhwan directed their activities against the Al-Saud family. They
preached against its governance, religious practice and corruption.267 For many years, the
government did not take the Ikhwan seriously. After all, they were largely remnants of a
centuries-old movement. However, when they stormed the Sacred Mosque at Mecca, it
became clear that they should not have been underestimated. With the intention of
providing an alternative government for Arabia, the siege of the Mosque lasted for

264 Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition (Washington: Washington
Policy for Near East Studies, 2000), 19-20.
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twenty-two days. From that point on, the House of Saud took opposition voices all the
more seriously.268 Moreover, the royal family began asserting an even stronger tie
between Islam and its rule. Illustrative of this was the late King Fahd’s decision to
replace his title ‘his royal majesty’ with lkhadim al-haramain - the servant of the two
sanctuaries.’269
Despite the above initiatives, namely the close ties of religion with the
government and the iron grip the government attempts to keep over the population,
opposition in Saudi Arabia remains commonplace. Throughout the first Gulf War, the
presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil increased calls for an authentic Islamic government
in Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, the liberal and secular movement became more active,
calling for the liberalization of the government and a loosening of restrictions over
women. Some women were pushing for the permission to drive. In a landmark event,
approximately seventy women took to the streets in their cars in petition. The religious
opposition was outraged. The Saudi leadership was being pulled in opposite directions. In
an attempt to appease both sides, King Fahd announced his intention to conduct political
reforms and open a majlis al-shura on one hand, and maintain the law prohibiting women
to drive in the kingdom on the other.270
The Islamic Opposition in Saudi Arabia has taken many forms. According to a
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, opposition movements in
the Kingdom can be categorized into three main groups: intellectual non-violent criticism,

268 Ibid and Tietelbaum, 19-22.
269 Ayubi, Political Islam, 104.
270 Tietelbaum, 25-33.

83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

non-violent political activism and others which use violence as a means to achieve their
goals.

771

While the government does respond with arrests, it prefers to use bribes and

other method of cooptation discussed in the previous chapter in order to quell opposition.
The government closely monitors the activities of those in the first two groups, but does
not want to risk creating “martyrs of otherwise weak opposition figures.”272 Other known
groups in Saudi Arabia include followers of Osama Bin Laden and A1 Qaeda. However,
their overt and violent tactics are more directed against Western influence in the region.
Saudi initiatives against them are widely reported and known. Hence, it is more important
to this discussion to mention the more moderate movements.
Among the movements that originated as intellectuals criticizing the Saudi
government are the Committee for the Defense o f Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and the
Movement fo r Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA).

77T

CDLR was in effect one of the

consequences of the Gulf War. It officially formed in 1993, and began to be noticed by
officials later the same year. The aims of the CDLR can be summarized as follows:
“...struggle for the elimination of injustices, the restoration of legitimate rights, and the
guarantee of peoples’ right to express their opinions freely and to live in honour and
dignity in an environment of equality and justice.”274 Saudi expatriate members of the
CDLR in Western nations have claimed to be a human rights organization fighting for
271 Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century: IV.
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democracy in Saudi Arabia. However, they have been accused of merely operating under
a democratic facade in order to gain Western support. In fact, the CDLR calls for the
overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and the implementation of their definition of a truly
Islamic state. The leader of the CLDR, Mohammed Al-Masari, fled to the United
Kingdom in 1994, where he continued to disseminate materials criticizing the Saudi
government.275
The Saudis have accused the CDLR of engaging in violence within the Kingdom.
These accusations have been denied by the CDLR. However, the CDLR did warn that
violence could occur if the Saudi government continued to repress the voice of the
opposition.276 The threat of violence combined with Al-Masari’s own expression of
sympathy for the perpetrators of the fatal 1996 terrorist attack of the US Air force
complex at Al-Khobar made it difficult to overlook potential radical elements of the
movement. Even though the Al-Khobar attack was carried out by the Saudi Hizbollah - a
Shi’a organization within Saudi Arabia with links to Iran and Lebanon - Al-Masari’s
own admittance of understanding cast shadows over his ambitions.277 In the same year,
Saad Al-Faqih, one of the leaders of CDLR, left the organization and created his own
group, named the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). Some attribute the
split to Al-Masari’s comments, while others have alleged that Al-Faqih cooperated with
the Saudis and so pitted himself against Al-Masari.278 What is known, however, is that
MIRA seems to be a more moderate organization than its precursor.
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Al-Faqih heads the organization from London. Essentially, MIRA calls for the
creation of a new shura council (consultative council) within the Saudi Kingdom. This
new council would be directly elected by the people and would hold enough power to
appoint the head of government. The ambitions of MIRA are clearly aimed at the
overthrow of the Al-Saud family rule. In a 2003 interview, Al-Faqih claimed:
We are demanding changes in the country and these changes are
simply incompatible with the survival of the regime. I don't expect the
regime to bring about comprehensive reforms on its own. It cannot tolerate
even minimal freedoms of expression and assembly. If these freedoms
were allowed, people would demand an accounting of the many billions of
dollars stolen by the royals and, if they were not stopped, they would then
encircle the princes' palaces, demanding the return of these billions.
People would demand that those behind the abuse of thousands of
prisoners be prosecuted and, if not stopped, would attack the prisons or the
Interior Ministry. The regime is instinctively aware of this and will not
allow it to happen.279
Al-Faqih’s bold statements have naturally placed him in great disfavour with the Saudi
government. Yet his absence from the Kingdom however makes it difficult for them to
co-opt him or the entire movement. Despite Al-Faqih’s claim that MIRA aims to achieve
its goals strictly through peaceful measures, the Saudi government has resorted to
smearing both Al-Faqih and the movement. Al-Faqih has also claimed to be the victim of
an attempted kidnapping.280
Saudi Arabia’s struggle with the Islamic opposition is not unique. As already
discussed in the case of Egypt and Syria, many governments in the Arab-Islamic world
are struggling to keep control of dissenting voices within their respective populace. This
has proven to be no easy task. Throughout the region, various manifestations of Islamic

279 Abedin, interview with Al-Faqih.
280 Ibid.
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opposition movements have permeated diverse elements of society. In many places they
mobilize demonstrations against relations with Israel as well as hold protests against
Western military involvement in the region, such as the 2003 U.S. invasion and
subsequent occupation of Iraq. In nations like Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Kuwait,
Islamists engage in legal battles and media campaigns against permissive writers and
television programs.281 In Bahrain, they demonstrated in favour of a constitution until it
was finally adopted in February of 2002.282 Furthermore in Lebanon and Morocco,
Islamic groups organize strikes against the high cost of living.

98^

The previous chapter already reviewed how Arab regimes maintain their rule
through rent, through paying lip service to the guardianship of an Arab and/or Islamic
cause or society, and through sustaining powerful organizations to monitor, control and at
times suppress all political and religious functions.284 In fact, it can be said that autocratic
regimes form strong branches and security agencies “whose main job is to absorb or
repress rival political voices.”285 Essentially, irrespective of the type of government in
place, all Arab states have strong law enforcement.286 To justify their repressive measures

281 Emmanuel Sivan, “Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Taking Over Governments,” Middle East Review o f
International Affairs (MERIA), Volume 2, Number 2 (May 1998).
282 A translation o f the Constitution o f Bahrain is available online at the Government o f Bahrain Website:
Hamad bin Isa A1 Khalifa, “Constitution of the Kingdom o f Bahrain,” Bahrain Government Homepage
(February 14, 2005), http://www.bahrain.gov.bh/images/constitutione.pdf.
283 Sivan.
284 Daniel Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” Journal o f Democracy, Volume 13, Number 4
(October 2002), 58.
285 Brumberg, 58.
286 Daniel 1. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, “The Enigma of Political Stability in the Persian Gulf
Monarchies,” Middle East Review o f International Affairs (MERIA), Volume 3, Number 3 (September
1999).
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and the use of force, most governments point to the Islamist threat. As a means of
avoiding the use of force in all situations, some governments have adopted ways of
involving Islamic groups in politics. Egypt is a case in point. The Egyptian government
has outlawed the Ikhwan Al-Muslimin and refused its bid to run in parliamentary
elections. In addition, it hinders the creation of any Islamic political party and does not
want to promote “a liberal Islamic party, either because they fear that radicals might
capture it or because they do not want a successful liberal Islamist party to ally with
secular parties in ways that might undermine the regime’s strategy of survival through a
delicate balancing act.”287 However, it is widely known and accepted that the Ikhwan
works within the system and that many of the independent parliamentarian candidates are
in fact members of the Ikhwan.288
Looking back over the section on Sustaining Legitimacy in Modem Arab States in
Chapter 2, one can find a more detailed discussion of the measures taken by various
governments to both suppress and/or appease the Islamic opposition. These range from
the ways governments have co-opted the opposition into the system through the creation
of shura councils or elected parliaments to the token electoral processes found in Egypt
and Yemen. While these minor reforms serve the dual purpose of appeasing both internal
and external demands for liberalization, they do little to truly enhance the level of civil
engagement in politics. Despite this, many Islamic activists have called for
democratization in their respective nations. In countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,

287 Brumberg, 62.
288 See for example Sana Abed-Kotob, “The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies o f the Muslim
Brotherhood o f Egypt,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies, Volume 27, Number 3 (August 1995),
321; and John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam,” Harvard
International Review, Volume 24, Number 4 (Winter 2003).
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Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen, members of Islamic opposition
movements have participated in parliamentary elections.289 Moreover, according to a
number of sources, the Egyptian Ikhwan Al-Muslimin has every intention of remaining
committed to democratic development within Egypt.290 The Brotherhood has the largest
base of support in Egypt. Thus, it would be beneficial for the Ikhwan to remain
committed to working within the system. John Walsh of Harvard University asserts that if
there were a completely free election in Egypt, “the Brotherhood would carry the country
in a landslide.”291 However, given a hypothetical attainment of power, it is unknown
whether or not the Islamic opposition would uphold the democratic process that brought
them there.292
Partly due to this uncertainty, the Western world provides little encouragement for
political change. First of all, many of the authoritarian regimes, such as the Saudi
monarchy, are allies with the West. Second, as in the case of Egypt, the most formidable
opposition in a majority of Arab states are Islamic. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that
a free and fair election would result in the Islamists’ attainment of power. As such, the
West is afraid that an Islamic opposition group in power would be intolerant and violent
- particularly against Western interests.293 While the West speaks about the importance
of democratization across the world, its seems to prefer an undemocratic Middle East to a
democratic one that is unfriendly. Historical evidence suggests the same. In 1951 and
289 Bill and Springborg, 58.
290 Abed-Kotob, 321; and Walsh.
291 Walsh.
292 Walsh.
293 Walsh.
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1957, the U.S. sided against democratic forces “in favour of despotic but friendly
monarchs” in Iran and Jordan respectively294 Furthermore, the media and even many
scholars contend that an Islamic movement in power would be hostile, anti-democratic,
and violent. Samuel Huntington’s predictions of a “clash of civilizations” are believed as
though they were prophetic insight. Amos Perlmutter, a political scientist at the American
University, is cited as one who typifies the above perspective.

In his writings, he

emphasizes “the very real threat of Islamic fundamentalism.” According to Perlmutter,
“there is no spirit of reconciliation between Islamic fundamentalism and the modem
world - that is, the Christian-secular universe.”295
Western perceptions around Islamic government may be part of the reason why
the refusal to cede power to the democratically elected Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)
party of Algeria met with little to no disapproval in the West. Despite the Islamic
opposition’s 1990 electoral victory, it was denied its win. The second set of elections was
cancelled, a military coup took place and thousands of FIS members were arrested.
Following this retreat from the democratic modus operandi, Algeria was swept into
turmoil. Violence between the FIS and the government went on for years. Even now, the
situation is at a stalemate.296 Rather than advocating democratization, the West remains
silent. It seems its prefers dictators to democratically elected Islamists who could change
the course of foreign relations.
294 Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London and New
York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 402.
295 Amos Perlmutter, “Wishful Thinking about Islamic Fundamentalism,” Washington Post (January 19,
1992) as cited by Abed-Kotob, 321.
296 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “The Islamist Challenge in North Africa,” Middle East Review o f Islamic
Affairs (MERIA), Volume 1, Number 2 (July 1997). Available online:
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/joumal/1997/issue2/jvln2a7.html.
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Notwithstanding common Western beliefs regarding Islam as hostile and adverse
to political development, violence is not an innate component of Islamic movements.
Many of the most prominent thinkers advocated peaceful means of opposition. While
radical elements of Islamic revivalism may truly be incompatible with democracy and
perhaps even modernity, other strains of the Islamic opposition may not be. There are
many moderate Islamic organizations calling for political reform and the adoption of
democratic processes. One such example comes from the works of Gamal Al-Banna, the
younger brother of Hasan Al-Banna. Gamal addressed the issue of Islam and democracy
by carefully looking at Islamic heritage. Through his research, he composed a framework
based on Islam that is “very supportive of pluralism, of democracy, shura, and of human
rights, and respect for non-Muslims.”297 Gamal A1 Banna is not alone in his modem
interpretations. In fact, his works are part of a series of twenty books by different Islamic
reformers and thinkers from all over the Muslim world 298 Moreover, the Ibn Khaldun
Centre for Development Studies is engaging in an Islamic reformation project. One task
of this project is to compile monographs from fifteen different Islamic reformers. This
project aims to squarely confront the “socio-political and moral issues of vital concern to
both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.” Specifically, these books will address the
following issues: basic human rights and particularly the rights of women and nonMuslim minorities in a predominantly Muslim society; the use of violence and the
concept of jihad; and liberal democratic governance. Through this they will look at the
basic social, religious and political freedoms articulated in United Nations’ international

297 Ibrahim in CSIS Briefing Notes, 16.
298 Ibid.
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conventions, freedom of speech as well as the freedom to proselytize and to convert from
Islam.299 Hence, there are a variety of types of Islamic movements. There is a clear
distinction between what Saad Eddin Ibrahim calls the “hijacked Islam” of the Taliban or
other Jihadi Islamic movements and the moderate calls to return to Islam.300 Despite these
differences, the Islamic opposition remains largely repressed by their own governments
and feared by the non-Muslim and particularly Western world.

299 “The Islamic Reformation Program,” Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies (Cairo: 5, 6 October
2004). Available online: http://www.eicds.org/english/activities/programs/islamicreform.htm.
300 Ibrahim in CSIS Briefing Notes, 16.
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C h a p t e r 4:

Economic Aspirations and Endeavours

Economic uncertainty is prevalent across much of the MENA region. Many of
these state economies depend almost exclusively on the oil industry. In many other states,
great wealth disparity exists between the social classes.301 The economic crisis of the
mid-1980s accentuated the problem. As a result, governments began to seriously look at
their economic programmes and develop fresh strategies for dealing with the new global
economy and the incumbent problems this brought to the region. At the same time, the
population grew increasingly dissatisfied with their governments’ inability to solve
economic woes. Membership in Islamic opposition movements rose. Not only were new
forms of government desired, but also new ways of solving economic challenges. The
ostensible failure of Western secular models brought another idea to the table. Islam,
perceived as a complete way of life, could provide not just the ideal form of government
but also a model for running the economy. Since that time, Islamic movements have been
largely unable to attain complete power or even strongly penetrate governing bodies.
Meanwhile, states such as Egypt began a series of economic reforms to meet new
demands. The liberalization of mostly state-controlled economies was underway.
Nevertheless, liberalization did little to subdue the Islamic opposition. In fact, some have
argued that it intensified calls for Islamic direction.302 Since most reforms were

301 Nazih N. Ayubi, O verstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London and New
York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 399-402.
302 Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London and New
York: I.B. Taurus Publishers, 2001), 163.
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recommended from abroad, they carried with them the perception of foreign economic
domination and dependence. 303 Therefore, it could be argued that an indigenously
developed economic development programme would be better fit for the region and
better received by the population. However, concern about the implications that might
accompany the notion of an Islamically constructed economic system have played a hand
in preventing its fruition.
The first chapter of this paper discussed the theoretical background of Islam and
economics. It illustrated that Islamic doctrine itself posed no real hindrance to economic
advancement or compatibility with the existing global system. Moreover, what was
proposed by Muslim scholars themselves was not markedly different from existing
models. With the exception of the incorporation of religion into the economic discussion
and a value-based imperative of social justice, Islamic economic theory was not in the
least bit adverse to capitalist features of rationalism, production, trade and commerce.304
However, we determined that while there was no clearly defined Islamic economic model
per se, there were a series of guidelines gleaned from the Qur’an and prophetic traditions,
which can be used in the formation of an economic model. Thus, rather than one
particular Islamic model, there are scores of ways Islamic teachings could be interpreted
into an economic model. Thus, there is the possibility of an Islamic Economic Option
(IEO), which could be shaped to fit different developmental stages or country
experiences. Indeed, there is potential that an Islamic economic model could be an option
for many countries. The question then becomes what the adoption of this option would

303 Kienle, 163.
304 See for example, Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, translated by Brian Pearce (Austin:
University of Texas Press: 1978).
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look like should an Islamic opposition movement attain power. The remainder of this
chapter will look at the platform of the Islamic opposition as well as existing
manifestations of Islamic economics found in the burgeoning Islamic banking institutions
across the globe.

Economic Platform o f the Opposition
Islamic opposition movements are becoming more visible throughout the MENA
and even across the world. With the intensification of political and economic uncertainty
and instability in the MENA, many people are looking for a means to explain
developmental stagnation as well resolve it. Islam seems to provide the answer.
According to Giacomo Luciani, “the common Islamic language is not sufficient to
transform generic dissatisfaction and revolt into a political movement.”305 Thus, it is the
combination of economic, political and social deficiency that causes the appeal of Islamic
opposition movements to increase. This increase has been partially attributed to
democratization. A number of scholars espouse an argument linking the fiscal crisis of
the state to democratization.306 They contend that if a state does not encounter an
economic crisis, then it has no real reason to democratize or liberalize. This is especially
true of the rentier states. This hypothesis indicates why states with minimal access to rent
tend to be more democratic whereas rent-rich states tend to be less so.307 States that face a

305 Giacomo Luciani, “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis o f the State and Democratization,” Ghassan Salame,
(ed.). Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal o f Politics in the Muslim W orldfLondon and New
York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 144.
306 See for example, Luciani’s article in Ghassan Salame, (ed.). Democracy Without Democrats, 130-155.
307 Bradley Louis Glasser, Economic Development and Political Reform: The Impact o f External Capital on
the Middle East (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 2001), 124.
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fiscal crisis will inevitably have to begin to liberalize. Liberalization signals weakness,
sets the stage for the development of civil society and increases the strength of the
opposition.308 This argument suggests that it is not exceedingly implausible to assert that
an Islamic opposition’s rise to power is perhaps a possibility. Algeria provides a good
example of the argument linking the fiscal crisis of the state with democratization. The
government of Algeria never even considered loosening its hold over politics or the
economy until it faced a huge economic downturn in the mid-1980s. The decline of
government prominence opened the door to competing forces to meet the needs left by
the government’s failures. The 1991 successes of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in
municipal and provincial elections was a direct consequence of the economic downturn
and subsequent political liberalization.309
It seems logical to assume that an Islamic opposition movement could come to
power in a MENA state, given that Islamic movements form the strongest opposition to
regimes in the region. Much of the resistance to the government stems from economic
inadequacies. Thus, much of the rhetoric against the government accuses it of poor
economic management. One may well wonder what the opposition proposes in terms of
economic development. The political platforms of the Islamic opposition primarily fall
under the categories described in the thought and writings of Islamic reformers calling for
renewal in the Muslim community. Most Islamic groups call for the establishment of an
Islamic state. Some discuss what it may look like or what it is supposed to look like
according to sacred texts. However, one hears much less about what these movements put
forward in terms of economic strategy. Presently, most of the MENA states are fairly
308 Luciani in Salame, Democracy Without Democrats, 134.
309 Luciani in Salame, Democracy Without Democrats, 144-149.
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integrated into the global economy, insofar as they are highly dependent on foreign
trade.310 While some Islamic organizations do call for the cessation of all relations with
the West, it seems likely that a structured and pragmatic opposition would continue to
operate on a global scale.
On the whole, Islamic opposition movements in the Arab-Islamic world have not
published specific economic platforms. This may partly be due to the fact that they are
not fully recognized or legally acknowledged Islamic parties. Therefore, they do not have
the necessity to craft specific electoral platforms. The Egyptian Ikhwan Al-Muslimin is a
case in point. While a number of Ikhwan members have spoken about the Islamic
attributes of the state and economy, few have specifically translated it for the modem era.
They, like the scholars and theorists discussed in the first chapter, look at the importance
of rational activity, production and profit, as well as the Islamic imperative of social
justice. However, these discussions are all theoretical with no specific steps for
implementation in today’s world.311
Even Sayyid Qutb’s earlier book on Social Justice in Islam did not detail practical
application. After discussing political and economic theory in Islam, Qutb concluded his
book by discussing “the Present State and the Prospects of Islam”312 In this chapter, Qutb
called for the renewal of Islamic life. He asserted that the society in which he lived was
not a truly Islamic society. As such, it disregarded many important principles Islam

310 Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics o f Development in the Middle
East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 66.
311 See Sana Abed-Kotob, “The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies o f the Muslim Brotherhood
of Egypt,n International Journal o f Middle East Studies, Volume 27, Number 3 (August 1995),
312 Sayyid Kotb, Social Justice in Islam, translated by John B. Hardie (n.p.: Islamic Book Services, n.d.,
first published by Cairo: Maktabat Misr, n.d. approximately 1945), 227-276.
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deemed necessary for a nation’s success and proper livelihood. He also reviewed the
successes throughout Islamic history as well as the negative aspects of Western
•

•

capitalism.

“X

1^

The latter half of the chapter becomes somewhat more practical as he

discusses ten (10) areas of law to ensure a strong economy and society that did not
neglect social justice. He wrote about laws governing the poor tax, the mutual
responsibility of society, general taxation, public resources, public interest, legacies,
mutual help and usury, gambling, prostitution, and alcohol.3,4 However, even his
discussion of these laws was centred on the theory of Islamic regulations, with little to no
mention of how they would be applied should an Islamic state come to be.
In more recent times, the Ikhwan has also been criticized for not detailing socio
economic programs of reform. While they discuss broad goals to solve the problems of
economic decline and low living standards, strategies for achieving these goals are left
unsaid. Ann Lesch has identified the most practical declaration of economic development
requirements articulated by the Brotherhood. These include:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Shrinking the government bureaucracy and public sector;
Official adherence to standards of high productivity;
The private sector as the backbone of the economy;
A non-interest bearing banking system;
Zakat; and
Independence from foreign economic intervention.315

Many of the Ikhwan’s principles and, indeed, Islamic notions on economics in general,
have been identified as closely related to socialism. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s
focus on the private sector and their call for shrinking government bureaucracy display a
313 Kotb, 227-266.
314 Ibid., 267-276.
315 Ann Lesch cited in Abed-Kotob, 327.
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flare of laissez-faire economics.316 In fact, the Brotherhood supported Anwar Sadat’s
economic liberalization initiatives, a move that apparently enriched a significant number
of Ikhwan members. In fact in 1980, 8 out of 18 families who dominated Egypt’s private
sector were associated with the Ikhwan al-Muslimin,317
According to the above list, the Brotherhood also calls for independence from
foreign economic intervention. While this sounds like an extreme measure, they are
actually advocating the integration of Muslim economies to prevent reliance on the
West.318 MENA countries are among the most dependent countries in the world.319 Many
feel that the poor performance of their economies can partially be attributed to foreign
economic subjugation. Thus, limiting this control seems a desirable ambition. One can
only speculate as to whether this independence would be translated as a complete
termination of economic relations with the West, or just a step in shifting their economic
reliance away from the West. It seems impractical to suggest that they would be willing
and/or able to fully withdraw from the global economy. As a result of their lack of a
detailed platform, one can only hypothesize how a Muslim-Brotherhood-led government
would evolve.
The Muslim Brotherhood is not the only organized Islamic movement with a lack
of clear economic strategies. Even other highly organized opposition groups have not
carefully constructed economic strategies. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT) is one such Islamic
group that calls for reform in a variety of Muslim countries around the world, such as
316 Abed-Kotob, 327.
317 Joel Beinin, “Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy o f an Egyptian
Social Movement,” The New Centennial Review, Volume 5, Number 1 (Spring 2005), 120.
318 Abed-Kotob, 327.
319 Ayubi, O verstating the Arab State, 401.
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Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan. While the group functions trader the guise of a human
rights movement, it is an Islamist movement aimed at the establishment of Islamic
leadership in many nations. Hizb ut-Tahrir teachings are radical interpretations of Islamic
doctrine. The group disregards all other forms of religion, secular ideology and even
Muslim organizations by terming them unacceptable unbelieving (kufr) organizations and
belief systems. Today HUT is based primarily in the United Kingdom.
Unlike more traditional Islamic parties, Hizb ut-Tahrir is supranational and
refuses to be involved in local politics. Therefore, it is impossible for regional leaders to
co-opt the group. HUT is not a political party in the sense that it does not want to
participate in national politics, run in elections or be part of any coalition government. It
has long claimed its desire to achieve its objectives through non-violent means. While it
has clearly written principles, goals and objectives of establishing Muslim leadership, it
has not clearly delineated a structured development plan. Hizb ut-Tahrir has published a
152-page book entitled the Economic System o f Islam.321 This work is probably one of
the best representations of an Islamist movement’s program for economic reform. It
clearly describes different economic principles adduced from HUT’s interpretation of
sacred texts. Moreover, HUT delves into the intricacies of topics like production,
ownership, enterprise, public and private property, as well as foreign trade. Hence, much
of the book examines the theory of Islamic economics. It also discusses the previous way
Islamic societies functioned, and criticizes both capitalist and socialist models. However,

320 See Hizb Ut-Tahrir, The Methodology o f Hizb Ut-Tahrir fo r Change (London: Al-Khalifah Publications,
1999), 16. Publication available online on the official site o f Hizb-Ut-Tahrir: http://www.hizb-uttahrir.org/english; and Olivier Roy, “Qibla and the Government House: The Islamist Networks,” SAIS
Review, Volume 21, Number 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), 61-62.
321 Hizb Ut-Tahrir, The Economic System O f Islam (London: Al-Khalifah Publications, 2000). Publication
available online on the official site o f Hizb-Ut-Tahrir: http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english.
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HUT fails to delineate specifically what type of actions an Islamic state in transformation
would take to bring about the implementation of its definition of an Islamic economic
model. For example, in regards to ways of solving the ‘economic problem’ it writes:
... one finds that the Islamic method in solving the economic problem is
the very same method Islam uses in solving any of the other human
problems. The common approach of Islam is to study the reality of the
economic problem, understand it, and then deduce a solution for the
problem from the Shari ’ah texts after studying these texts, and to ensure
that they apply to that particular problem. This is different from the
Capitalist and Socialist method. In Capitalism, the situation which resulted
from the problems is used as a source for the solutions (pragmatism). In
Socialism the solutions are taken from hypothetical assumptions which are
imagined to be existent in the problem, and the solutions are put according
to these assumptions. Each of these two methods is different to the method
of Islam, so it is not allowed for a Muslim to adopt them.322
The above paragraph is demonstrative of the tone throughout much of HUT’s
literature. It discusses the theory of the Islamic way, asserts the supremacy of the Islamic
system, and then utilizes a sort of loose deduction of the Islamic “method” without
detailing an applicable solution. Moreover, throughout the text, Western models are
consistently criticized for their downfalls. However, the only reason presented for not
using or incorporating Western models is that they are not specifically Muslim.
Despite HUT’s adherence to religious absolutism, the fact Hizb ut-Tahrir is such
a large organization makes it interesting to look at its economic proposals or lack thereof.
While its beliefs are fairly radical, its commitment to non-violence has been abided by.323
Since Hizb ut-Tahrir is such a large organization based in the UK, it is arguably among
the most organized Islamic opposition movements in the world today. Nevertheless, by
and large it has failed to construct a specific economic platform. Literature released by
322 Ibid., 44-45.
323 Roy, 61.
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Islamic opposition movements is difficult to come across in English. However, what has
been written seems largely void of any discussion of economic strategy. The Ikhwan AlMuslimin and the Hizb ut-Tahrir are good examples of Islamist movements. The former,
in existence for a number of decades, is a moderate movement predominately functioning
at a national level, although it has offshoot branches in other Muslim nations. The latter,
based in the West since the mid-1950s, is a more radical, though non-violent, movement
functioning at the international level. Both movements are fairly organized in comparison
to other Islamist movements. However, their economic strategies still have not been
clearly detailed. Since there is not enough written on the subject, it is unknown how they
would operate, given a hypothetical rise to power at this point in their development.
Nevertheless, because the literature and theory behind the Islamic economic
option is not in the least bit opposed to progress, modernization or even existing
economic systems, it is reasonable to assume that an Islamic government would function
well within the global order. Should this government adhere to contemporary moderate
calls for the implementation of Islam into the economic sphere, the outcome could be
better fit to the circumstances of the Arab-Islamic world.

Global Islamic Banking
Throughout history, Muslim countries have rarely been governed by strict Islamic
economic principles. Perhaps the only time since the establishment of Islam that
adherence was strict was during the reigns of Abu Bakr and Umar, the first two Islamic
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caliphs.324 In the absence of a practical example of an Islamic economic model, one must
resort to relying on Islamic economic theories and expressions of Islamic economics to
determine the feasibility of an Islamic approach in the contemporary era.

In the

discussion in chapter one, we concluded that theoretically an Islamic economic option
could be both feasible and compatible with the new world order. While there are a few
challenges to this compatibility, namely the faith-based imperative and the prohibition of
riba, these are not insurmountable. In addition, incumbent expressions of Islamic
economics have materialized in the proliferation of Islamic banking and financing across
the Muslim world and even in many Western nations.
Modem Islamic banking began in 1963 in Egypt with the creation of a rural
savings bank.325 However, it did not really flourish until the establishment of the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and founding
of the Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) in 1975.326 It was at this time that the concept of Islamic
banking really began to advance. After the establishment of the DIB, other Islamic
banking experiments followed suit. The greatest subsequent initiative was headed by
Prince Muhammad Al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia in 1977. He established an Islamic banking
chain known as the Faisal Islamic Banks. The Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt and Sudan
were the first two Faisal Banks. They were soon followed by the Islamic Bank of Jordan,
324 John Thomas Cummings, Hossein Askari, and Ahmad Mustafa, “Islam and Modem Economic Change,”
in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change (New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1980), 45.
325 Humayon A. Dar, “Financial Sector Reforms in the OIC Countries: The Islamic Influence,” One Day
Workshop on the Contribution o f Religion and Culture to Economic and Financial Development (Kuwait:
Gulf University for Science and Technology, February 13, 2005). Transcript can be found online at:
http://www.gust.edu.kw/Workshop/Social.html.
326 Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 1995), 119.
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the Bait Al-Tamwil of Kuwait, and the Al-Baraka financial group.327 A number of
successive initiates followed suit, among them the Bahrain and Qatar Islamic Bank which
opened in 1979 and 1982 respectively.328 With the exception of the DIB, other Islamic
banking endeavours across the Muslim world were initially met with limited success. The
DIB became known as the only real successful Islamic bank. They monopolized the
market in the region until 1998 when the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB) commenced
operations. As a result of the DIB’s primary domination of the Islamic banking market,
service quality and customer service was poor. However, the entrance of ADIB into the
market brought a new advanced management style, image and “strategic thrust.” 329
Today, ADIB is the world’s largest Islamic bank by capitalization.330 Islamic banking has
since become more competitive in the Middle East and around the world. Even secular
banks in the Arabian Gulf such as the National Bank of Shaijah and Amlac Finance
began to offer Islamic banking options.331 At present, Malaysia and Bahrain are among
the most active Islamic banking markets in the world.332
Indeed, Islamic finance has become a rapidly growing global business. It is now
consistently expanding into new markets and products. The IDB and Business Week
report figures that there are over 265 Islamic banks in the world with total assets
327 Ayubi, Political Islam, 181.
328 Wilson, 118-119.
329 Informal interview with Ahmed El-Shall, SVP Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank. (Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates, 13 February 2005).
330 SHUAA Capital PSC, “Company Profile: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank,” A M E Info, Available online:
http://www.ameinfo .com/financial_markets/U AE/Company_AE0004.
331 Ibid.
332 Gamal Essam El-Din, “Islamic Finance Comes of Age,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, Issue Number 752
(21-27 July 2005). Available online: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/752/ec3.htm.
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estimated to be over USD $262 billion and financial investments over USD $200
billion.333 According to Ahmed Mohamed Ali, president of the IDB, there are three prime
factors that can be attributed to the growth of the Islamic finance and banking industry.
First, Islamic banks appeal to Muslim clients because these banks have shariah boards in
place to ensure the activities of the bank are in compliance with Islamic principles.
Second, the mood since September 11th, 2001 has encouraged wealthy Arabs and
governments to repatriate their foreign investments to domestic Islamic banking
institutions. Third, Ali claimed the EDB played a strong role in enhancing Islamic
banking services.334
In an interview, Ahmed El-Shall, Senior Vice-President Strategic Planning and
Financial Control of ADIB, mirrored the above sentiment.335 In addition, he claimed that
there are two primary market segments for the Islamic finance industry. The first segment
is comprised of what he described as Muslim “puritans.” These are Muslims who restrict
their activity to complete adherence to Islamic principles, and consequently will only use
strictly Islamic methods of banking. According to El-Shall, this is the smaller market.
The second segment is the remainder of the Muslim community. El-Shall asserts that
approximately 80 percent of the Muslim population are undecided about their banking
options. They do not have a specific preference towards traditional secular institutions or
333 El-Din and Assif Shameen, “Islamic Banks: A Novelty No Longer,” Business Week Online (August 8,
2005); available online: http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_32/b3946141_inz035.htm.
334 El-Din.
335 Ahmed El-Shall is a prominent figure in the Islamic banking industry. Many reports on Islamic banking
as well as conferences on the topic consult his opinion. A simple internet search under his names reveals
the many conferences and publications that he has been involved in or consulted for. See for example:
http://www.iht.com/articles/113097.html; http://www.islamicfi.com/English/news/artical.asp?ID=59085;
http://www.encoremanagement.com/pdf/Risk%20Management%202003%20program.pdf; and
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/services/sections/fortune/intl/media/2001_12gulf_states.pdf.
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Islamic banks. However, if they were guaranteed the same level of service, quality and
image as conventional banking, they would be interested in Islamic banking.336 Thus, the
ADIB and its competitors strive to be on the cutting-edge of Islamic banking initiatives.
One of the more recent projects has been the unveiling of a new Islamic covered card.
This card serves as an alternative to conventional credit cards. It offers all the major
benefits of a credit card, only it functions in compliance with Islamic principles.337
Interestingly, the Sultanate of Oman has not permitted the creation of Islamic
banks or any religious banking option. However, Omani banks, such as Bank Dhofar, are
currently investigating creative ways to offer interest-free options to their customers.
Rather than being labelled Islamic banking, they are referred to as “alternative banking
options.”338 One newly launched service along those lines is the Al-Noor card, the first
interest-free card in Oman.

This card is very similar to ADIB’s new Islamic covered

card, only without religious language attached. However, its interest-free status will allow
it to reach the same market segment had it been specified as ‘Islamic.’ It is intriguing to
notice that while these cards claim to be interest-free, they do charge an ‘administrative
fee’ that is adjusted as a percentage of the amount spent. Although this fee is significantly
less than general credit card interest rates, it can still be construed as an amount gained
without effort from someone else’s arrears. Naturally, it is necessary for the bank to profit
336 Interview with El-Shall.
337 “Islamic Covered Card,” Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB) official website. Available online:
http://130.94.154.82/Main_E/Main.asp?tl=draC+derevoC+cimalsI%2DstcudorP+gnicnaniF%2DgniknaB+
lanosreP&g=l&i=l 64.
338

Informal discussion with Abdullah Farah, General Manager, Bank Dhofar (Muscat, Oman, February
2005).
339 “Bank Dhofar launches ‘4 / N oor’ - the First Interest Free card in Oman,” Bank Dhofar official website.
Available online: http://www.bdof.org/bankdhofar/noor.asp.
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in some way from these cards. Moreover, safeguards are in place to limit credit abuse
such as the “maximum spending limit of 3 times the salary.”340 However, whether these
cards really comprise an Islamic credit card or merely an alternative credit card depends
on the assessor.
Indeed, some authors have questioned the ‘Islamicity’ of the Islamic banking
modus operandi. Though Islamic symbolism is involved, it would be unreasonable to
attribute the Islamic banking formula solely to religious principles.341 Initially the drive
for Islamic banking in the region was appealing to “nationalistically-inclined people.”342
However, it soon became another business venture invoking the interest of the
commercial elite. Even El Shall contends that today many of the bankers involved in
Islamic banking moved over from traditional banking institutions. Although he asserts
that some have been motivated my religious commitment, a majority have engaged in
Islamic banking initiatives to capitalize on the growing market.343
The increasing appeal of Islamic banks has encouraged Western banks such as
HSBC, Citibank, BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank, to become steadily involved in
providing Islamic banking alternatives to their clientele.344 In fact, when HSBC began to
offer Islamic banking options in Malaysia, it was “surprised” that over half of its
customers were not Muslim.345 Moreover, in August 2004 the United Kingdom

340 “Islamic Covered Card,” ADIB.
341 Ayubi, Political Islam, 178-179.
342 Ibid, 179.
343 Interview with El Shall.
344 El-Din.
345 Shameen, Business Week Online.
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sanctioned the creation of the first Islamic banking institution in England, the Islamic
Bank of Britain.346 Perhaps the best expression of Islamic banking and finance industry in
the West can be found in the United States. Amid the failures of the U.S. banking
industry during the late 1980s and 1990s, the LARIBA banking concept was bom.347 Its
name was contrived from the Arabic la and riba, which together means no usury. It is
also an acronym which stands for Los Angeles Reliable Investment Bankers Associates
(LARIBA).348 Founded in 1987, LARIBA had high ambitions of evolving into a leader in
the world-wide Islamic banking system.349 However, to date it has only been mildly
successful in the United States. Even with this slight success, LARIBA has not yet
become a strong Islamic banking force. In fact, it has hardly expanded beyond the state of
California, where it was founded. Instead, it has relied on providing remote financial
services.350 In any case, its strength must be relatively significant as they remain a viable
banking alternative in the United States.
In keeping with Islam’s prohibition of usury, there are four primary features of
Islamic banking and financing - the Murabaha, Mudarabah, Ijara and Musharakah
contracts. Each of these contracts meets a different need in the financial and business
sector. The Mudarabah and the Musharakah contracts are both designed as a form of

346 Christopher Hope and Susannah Osborne, “Islamic law bank given go-ahead to open in UK,” [article
online] The London Telegraph, (posted August 9, 2004), available online:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtinl7xinWnews/2004/08/09/nbank09.xml
347 Dr. Yahia Abdul Rahman, LARIBA Bank: Islamic Banking - Foundation fo r a United & Prosperous
Community (Pasadena: Cedar Graphics, Inc., 1994), 3-4.
348 “Corporate Profile,” LARIBA American Finance House, available online:
http://www.lariba.com/company/index.htm.
349 Rahman, 107-108.
350 LARIBA American Finance House, available online: http://www.lariba.com.
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equity financing, whereas the Murabaha contract is a form of trade financing. The Ijara
contract is a leasing model. The duration of the financing between the four models varies
from short-term to long-term. The four main financing contracts have been compared in
the following table:

Table 2:
Comparison of Islamic Financing

Financing Contracts
Murabaha

Mudarabah

Ijara

Musharakah

Nature of
Financing

Trade financing

Equity financing

Lease financing Equity Financing

Type of
Financing

Deferred sale.
Asset purchased
by bank and
resold to client.

Trust financing/
profit-sharing

Leasing

Joint-venture/
partnership/
profit-sharing

Mid-term: 1 to 3
years.

Mid-term: 2 - 5
years.

Long term: 3 to
10 years.

Payment

Client’s cash
flow;
repossession of
sold assets;
customer’s
collateral

Mudarabah cash
flow; net value of
mudarabah;
personal assets of
client in case of
contract breach

Asset
Ownership

Client receives
ownership after
purchasing asset
from bank.

Mutual
ownership of
mudarabah fund.

Rate of
Return

Agreed markup
as per contract.

Based on profit
and loss. (Profitsharing)

Client’s cash
flow;
Venture cash
repossession of flow; or net asset
leased assets;
value of
musharakah
customer’s
collateral
Assets property
of bank until
lease over.
Equity ownership
Client receives of the
musharakah
ownership at
the end of the
contract.
Based on profit
Rental income and loss. (Profitand value of
sharing); and any
leased assets at annual dividends
time of contract or capital
appreciation.

Duration of Shortterm: 1
month to 2 years.
Financing

See footnote for references.

331

351 Table adapted from “Comparative Analysis o f Islamic Financing,” Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Official
Website, available online:
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The murabaha contract is the preferred method of financing by banking
institutions primarily because it is easier to implement. The mark-up placed on the asset
or property before sale to the borrower is not substantially different from interest-based
financing. The presence of risk is much higher in the mudarabah and musharakah
contracts. Thus, these contracts are least liked by banks but most called for by Islamic
scholars.

The ijara or leasing contract is becoming increasingly popular with Islamic

banks. It functions similarly to the ‘lease-to-own’ concept, but without the extravagant
interest rates. Under ijara, the bank maintains ownership of the asset and the client pays
an agreed-upon rental amount. Upon completion of the lease term, the client has the
option of paying the original price of the asset.353
The brief discussion provided regarding the history and global proliferation of
Islamic banking demonstrates how the Islamic expression of banking models can indeed
work within the contemporary world order. Muslim bankers have worked around the
problem of interest and investment and crafted creative measures to meet the financial
needs of the bank while simultaneously addressing the religious concerns of their
clientele. By and large, Marcus Noland’s assertion that Islam promotes growth can
indeed be affirmed when looking at the success of the Islamic economic option in terms
of the banking industry. Noland conducted research measuring religion, culture and
economic performance. According to his findings, Noland concluded the following of
Islam:

http://www.adib.co.ae/Main_E/index.asp?dff=gnicnaniF%20cimalsI%20fo%20sisylanA%20evitarapmoCgniknaB%20cimalsI%20tuobA&g=l&i=85. Information also used from: Wilson, 114-118
352 Wilson, 114-118; and El-Shall in interview.
353 Wilson, 116-117.
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The hypothesis that the coefficients on variables of religious affiliation are
jointly equal to zero can frequently be rejected at conventional levels of
statistical significance (religion matters), but no robust relationship
between adherence to major world religions and national economic
performance is uncovered using both cross-national and subnational data.
The results with respect to Islam do not support the notion that it is
inimical to growth. On the contrary, virtually every statistically significant
coefficient on Muslim population analyses—is positive. If anything, Islam
promotes growth.354
On the whole, Islamic banking institutions have been significantly successful. Their
ability to operate effectively in the current milieu affords greater optimism that an Islamic
economic option could succeed if adopted by a state.

354 Abstract of the paper "Religion, Culture, and Economic Performance" by Marcos Noland, Senior Fellow,
Institute o f International Economics, Washington D.C. cited by M. Fahim Khan, “Islam and Economic
Development: Need for Discovering the Underlying model,” One Day Workshop on the Contribution o f
Religion and Culture to Economic and Financial Development (Kuwait: Gulf University for Science and
Technology, February 13, 2005), 5. Transcript can be found online at:
http://www.gust.edu.kw/Workshop/Social.html.
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C onclusion

Throughout the course of this thesis, the concept of an Islamic Economic Option
(IEO) was examined. As noted, Western proclivity for secular political and economic
spheres makes it difficult to understand the impetus behind the desire to have a political
and economic system that adhered fully to Islam or at least works alongside and
strengthens an Islamic ethos. This sentiment is prominent throughout much of the ArabIslamic world, where a strong tie exists between faith and lifestyle. For those who are
less-devout, follow other religions or are largely-secular, this relationship can be
challenging and even intimidating. Consequently, it seemed important to examine the
concepts and theories of Islamic economics, the political situation in the Arab-Islamic
world, as well as Islamic banking already in place across the world.
This thesis reached a number of conclusions. Examining the framework for an
Islamic economic model revealed that while there is no specific economic model in Islam,
there are a series of principles that could be used to structure an economic model or
system based on Islam. The additional flexibility allowed by the guidelines could be
adjusted to fit different social and time constructs. By and large, Islamic economic
concepts are npt remarkably different from existing models. A model comprised by them
could be viewed as largely the same as contemporary economic models, namely a mix of
capitalist tendencies with a disposition toward social justice. Essentially, this is
comparable to the notion of a social welfare state. The defining aspect of an IEO is
characterized by the incorporation of religion into both political and economic spheres.
Theoretically, this option could be compatible with the current global economic system.
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In fact, the development of an indigenously constructed economic model serves a
political function by providing the perception of local ownership. Consequently, it would
attain greater legitimacy.
The primary problem of this assumption becomes evident when looking at the
existing opposition across the Arab world. This opposition is primarily Islamic in nature.
As a result of Islam’s emphasis on social justice, Muslim theorists often call for the
introduction of a “just” alternative to social development. In fact, according to Najib
Ghadbian, the “raison d’etre of any Islamic state is to establish justice and to work for the
prosperity of the community both in this life and the hereafter.”

However,

notwithstanding the calls for increased justice, there is a separation between Islamic
scholarly analysis and the language of opposition movements throughout the Arab world.
While early contemporary Muslim thinkers, such as Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Qutb,
influenced a number of Islamic movements, a majority of Islamic opposition groups have
not constructed a clear economic agenda. For the most part, their platforms only
mentioned theoretical notions found in Islam with regards to economics.
Since much of the opposition espouses a common Islamic terminology, it seems
to be organized and coherent. Nevertheless, merely using religious vocabulary is not
enough to sustain an entire political movement.356 Substantially defensive in nature, the
contemporary Islamic resurgence is a function of “spiritual panic” in the face of
continued political failures, Western penetration, perceived rapid demoralization of

355 Najib Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1997), 76.
356 Giacomo Luciani, “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization,” Ghassan Salame,
(ed.). Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal o f Politics in the Muslim W orldf London and New
York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 144.
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society, and suppression of religious and political expression in many of these nations.357
It has not been a constructive response to new challenges.358 Much of the rhetoric is not
well thought out and is ill-suited to the contemporary reality of running a state or
interacting with the global order. This lack of detail may be due to the fact that the
Islamic opposition is at an early stage in its political development. Its marginal position
and limited political movement inhibits the pace and progress of strategizing. Given more
time to work within the political system, platforms could be more clearly constructed.
Theoretically, an IEO could be successful. Assuming the community was Muslim,
an Islamic system could be progressive because theoretically it would have the support of
the entire community. From this viewpoint, the state alone could not make Islamic
economics work without the support of the community. The individual’s adherence to
Islamic principles is compelled by a faith-based construct. Thus, if the pursuit of
production and profit is encouraged in Islam, it is contingent on Muslims to make an
effort to be successful. However, Islamic economic principles also force the individual
not to focus solely on the accumulation of wealth, but rather on its redistribution.
Religious obligations of charity through zakat become a means of implementing a social
welfare program. Zakat, in effect, is both a personal act of worship and a contribution to
the well-being of society. Overall, the dual purpose of an Islamic state is to establish
justice and strive for the wealth of the community.359 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether
these theoretical foundations and aspirations are sufficient to transform an Islamic

' i e 07

Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation o f an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1982); and Sonn, 211.
358 Ibid.
359 Ghadbian, 76.
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political and economic governance system into a successful working model. The Islamic
opposition’s lack of solid strategy leaves much to be desired.360 Their overall weak
political position means they are only able to react as opposed to having the opportunity
to construct a valid and functional economic policy. Without time and opportunity, it
seems likely that if an IEO were to be implemented by the opposition at this point in its
development, it would be met with both limited success and a lack of compatibility with
the new world order. However, after more time to develop into a recognized and
pragmatic opposition, success is possible.
Thus, an IEO could be a feasible and practical economic option for the ArabIslamic world, given the right leadership and the strength and flexibility of Islamic
economic principles. Moreover, this option could be compatible with the global order.
The success of Islamic financial institutions seems indicative of this possibility. Indeed,
the incorporation of faith into the basis of economic governance may pose the strongest
challenge to the largely secular new world order. Nevertheless, the potential and viability
of an Islamic Economic Option should not be underrated.

Further research
New areas of research could be built upon from the threshold opened by this
thesis. First, further research could build upon the examination of Islamic economic
theories and financial institutions to conduct detailed case studies on a sample of Islamic
banks in a cross-section of nations. Practical experiments interesting to look at could
include the Faisal Islamic banking chain, the al-Baraka financial group, Islamic banking

360 Tamara Sonn, Between Qur 'an and Crown: The Challenge o f Political Legitimacy in the Arab World
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 211.
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in particular nations, such as the United Arab Emirates, among others. An extension of
this study could also take a comparative approach and examine Islamic banking in
Malaysia, Pakistan and Sudan.
A second study could be pursued to monitor the position and policy papers,
publications and press releases of a sample of Islamic opposition movements over a
number of years to gauge the strength and pragmatism of their economic platforms.
Thirdly, it would be useful to conduct a study on the evolution of government
economic policies and Islamic oppositional response. Currently, there are monumental
changes taking place. In the past, Islamic opposition groups have often operated under
covert conditions or at the margins of society. Today, doors that did not exist 3-5 years
ago are opening to opposition groups. Given these new political opportunities,
compromises by these movements can be expected. At the same time, existing states have
no option but to compromise with the Islamic opposition. A comparative study of the
politics and pragmatics of compromise, using as examples Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan,
would be a valuable addition to the literature.
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